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EVERYBODY OUT OF THE POOL: RECOGNIZING A FIRST
AMENDMENT CLAIM FOR THE RETALIATORY CLOSURE OF
(REAL OR VIRTUAL) PUBLIC FORUMS
FrankD. LoMonte*
First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court
over the past several decades, has as its primary, though
unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental
motives... . Or, to put the point another way, the application
of First Amendment law is best understood and most readily
explained as a kind of motive-hunting.
Elena Kagan]
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INTRODUCTION

In the seismic aftershock of Donald Trump's ascension to the
presidency, many hundreds of thousands of protesters overflowed public
streets, walkways and parks in cities across the United States to express
their dismay with the inauguration of a president they regarded as hostile
towards women's rights. The scenes of outraged marchers, which
dominated television screens worldwide in January 2017, were replicated
throughout the spring of 2018, as waves of demonstrators again flooded
America's streets, impelled by the horror of a mass shooting at South
Florida's Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School to demand action on
gun violence. 3
2. Meghan Keneally, More Than 1 Million Rally at Women's Marches in US and Around
World, ABCNEWS (Jan. 22, 2017, 8:06 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/womens-march44936 42

0

.

heads-washington-day-trumps-inauguration/story?id=

3. Peter Jamison et al., 'Never again!' Students demand action against gun violence in
nation's capital, WASH. PosT (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/march-for-

our-I ives-huge-crowds-gather-for-ral ly-against-gun-violence-in-nations-capital/
121 b1 00-2f7d-II e8-bOb0-f706877db618_story.html.
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Marches and rallies on public property have always been a uniquely
effective way for activists to make themselves heard. From the 1963
"March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom," at which Martin Luther
King Jr. delivered his indelible "I Have a Dream" speech before a
National Mall crowd estimated at 250,000 people, 4 to the "Occupy Wall
Street" economic-justice movement of 2011 that ignited in Manhattan's
Zuccotti Park and sparked copycat sit-ins across the globe, 5 people who
feel disenfranchised or under-represented have long depended on access
to public property to amplify their message.
Undeniably, government regulators could not single out
demonstrators on one side of a divisive political issue for preferred or
disfavored treatment. For instance, Congress could not selectively ban
pro-Second-Amendment marches or pro-abortion-rights rallies on federal
property. That much of the law of the First Amendment is clear. Perhaps
surprisingly, not much more is.
In recent years, two federal appellate courts have confronted the
question of whether government agencies can cut off all expressive
access to a swath of public property, even if the decision is unmistakably
intended to prevent a disfavored speaker or viewpoint from being heard. 6
The cases, one in the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals7 and one in
the sister Ninth Circuit,8 have provided little clarity to this murky area of
constitutional law. Before long, it will be necessary for the U.S. Supreme
Court to weigh in.
Clarifying where the First Amendment protection of speakers using
public property begins and ends has become more important than ever,
as our understanding of what qualifies as "public property" broadens to
include "virtual" as well as real property. While courts are rapidly coming
to the consensus that government authorities cannot constitutionally
block their critics from access to government-run social media pages, 9
courts have yet to decide the inevitable next question: Is there a
4. March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, NAT'L PARK
https://www.nps.gov/articles/march-on-washington.htm (last updated Aug. 10, 2017).

SERV.,

5. Julia La Roche, Here's What They're ChantingAt Occupy Wall Street, Bus. INSIDER
(Oct. 7, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/occupy-wall-street-chants-2011-10-

07.
6. See Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir.

2013); Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2019).
7. See generally Sons of Confederate Veterans, 722 F.3d 224.
8. See generally Koala, 931 F.3d 887.

9. See Robinson v. Hunt Cty., 921 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that a policy
which allows the county sheriff's office to remove certain comments from their Facebook page
can give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim of viewpoint discrimination); Knight First

Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 238 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that
the president of the United States cannot exclude members of the public from interacting with a
Twitter account that he and his White House staff use to make official policy pronouncements).
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constitutional violation if a government agency pulls the plug on a
Facebook page entirely, to deny people a platform to say unfavorable
things about the agency?
Answering that question will require the courts to hack through a
dense and befuddling thicket of First Amendment caselaw that has grown
up around the management of public expressive use of government
0
property: The "public forum" doctrine.1 This Article proposes that a
speaker who is denied access to public property for expression, because
the government attempts to revoke the "forum" status of the property to
keep the speaker from being heard, must necessarily have a First
Amendment claim. Since the First Amendment prevents government
agencies from narrowing the use of public property in discriminatory
ways," it logically follows that the government cannot abolish the
expressive use of property, either, when the forbidden objective is the
same.
This is not an uncontroversial proposition. Supreme Court caselaw
dating back to the early days of desegregation can be read to suggest that,
if the government denies everyone access to property-closing the
swimming pool to avoid integrating it-then there is no discrimination
and no constitutional violation.1 2 Needless to say, this would be quite a
terrible line of precedent around which to build the modern law of
freedom of expression.1 3 A better model is needed.
In Section II, this Article sets out what is known, and unknown, about
the First Amendment standards that govern the expressive use of publicly
owned property, both physical and metaphysical, and how those
standards are adapting to a world communicating at a pace of 5,700
tweets-per-second. 14 Section III examines the relatively scarce authority
addressing the constitutional rights of would-be speakers who challenge
the decision to close public property to expression. Section IV turns to
10. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, First Amendment Fora Revisited: How Many Categories Are
There?, 41 NOVA L. REV. 221, 228 (2017) ("[F]ederal appellate courts have remarkably, but
understandably, exhibited considerable confusion regarding the number of public forum
categories."); Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV.

647, 654 (2010) ("It is a bad sign if the doctrine is so confused that reasonable observers cannot
even agree on how many categories of forum exist.").

11. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(explaining that, once the state opens a limited public forum to some speakers, it "must respect
the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude where its distinction is not
'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum[.]"').

12. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971).
13. See Randall Kennedy, Reconsidering Palmer v. Thompson, 2018 Sup. CT. REV. 179,

179 (2018) (referring to the decision as "a judicial injustice.").
14. Raffi Krikorian, New Tweets per second record, and how!, TWITTER ENGINEERING
(Aug. 16, 2013), https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/a/2013/new-tweets-per-secondrecord-and-how.html (reporting that Twitter users post, on a typical day, more than 500 million
tweets, averaging out to 5,700 tweets per second).
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the most recent foray into the law affecting "forum closure," the Ninth
Circuit's decision in The Koala v. Khosla, 5 in which a student-produced
magazine specializing in tasteless humor is fighting to regain eligibility
for public funding.1 6 Section V analyzes how the federal courts have
considered the invidious motive behind facially neutral government
decisions in contexts outside the management of public property, and
concludes that the same standard-that the government cannot
accomplish a discriminatory objective by cloaking it in a guise of
neutrality-must necessarily apply to a total shutdown of speech on
public property.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PUBLIC FORUM
A. FirstAmendment basics
The Supreme Court has emphasized, time and again, that the First
Amendment exists to protect speakers, even those with extreme or
distasteful viewpoints, from undue government regulation."7 As the
Justices said in invalidating a statute that criminalized the expressive
burning of an American flag: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable." 18 "Prior restraints" that prevent speech from
being heard-for instance, impounding copies of a newsmagazine19
face a strong presumption of invalidity and almost never survive
constitutional scrutiny.2 0 But it is no more permissible for a government
actor to retaliate after-the-fact when the motive is to punish, or deter,
constitutionally protected speech. 2 1 The Supreme Court has said that
retaliation for constitutionally protected activity is akin to, and as
offensive as, "an 'unconstitutional condition' demanded for the receipt of
a government-provided benefit." 22
15. 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019).
16. Id. at 892-93.
17. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) ("[S]peech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt."); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)
("The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits."); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[T]he State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.").

18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
19. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 704-05 (1931).
20. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("[A] free society prefers
to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all

others beforehand.").
21. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998) (taking note of "clearly
established" doctrine that "the First Amendment bars retaliation for protected speech.").

22. Id. at 588 n.10.
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First Amendment scrutiny is triggered whenever government
regulatory or punitive action is directed at a speaker's content or
viewpoint. 2 3 A regulation is "content"-based if it singles out particular
topics or categories of speech for disfavored treatment,24 while a
regulation is "viewpoint"-based if it discriminatorily disfavors one side
of a contested issue. 25 For example, a prohibition on messages about
abortion would be content-based, and a prohibition on messages
opposing abortion would be viewpoint-based.
When a government regulation is deemed to be targeted to the content
or viewpoint of a speaker's message, it is presumptively unconstitutional,
unless the government can satisfy "strict scrutiny" by demonstrating that
the regulation is necessary to accomplish a compelling public purpose
and is narrowly tailored to restrict no more speech than necessary to
accomplish that purpose. 2 6 On the other hand, when a regulation is
"content neutral," it will be upheld as constitutional, even if it produces
some incidental and unintended constraints on speakers, unless it is
shown to be unreasonable. 27 As the Court stated, in rejecting
demonstrators' First Amendment challenge to a regulation against
sleeping in national parks, restrictions that incidentally burden speech are
constitutional so long as they "are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information."2
Finally, one subcategory of speech receives no constitutional
protection at all: The government's own speech. When the government is
regarded as the speaker (and the "speech" can be indirect and passive,
29
such as hosting a religious monument on public property ), nothing
constrains the government from making content-based or viewpoint0
based choices. 3

23. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015).
24. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The
First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on
particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.").

25. See McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The essence of a viewpoint
discrimination claim is that the government has preferred the message of one speaker over
another."); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(describing viewpoint discrimination as "an egregious form of content discrimination.").

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)

("When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the
content of what it says.").
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B. Evolution of the Forum Doctrine
Over a series of First Amendment cases, dating back to the 1930s, the
Supreme Court developed the concept of the "forum" to determine the
permissible level of regulation when a speaker seeks to use government
property for expression. 3 1 As early as 1939, the Court recognized that the
government could not criminalize distributing handbills on streets or in
parks that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." 3 2 Forum doctrine is grounded in the notion that, while all
government property belongs to the public, not all government property
is equally suitable for expressive use. 33 Consequently, the government's
authority to restrict or ban speech will vary with the character of the
space. 34 The same level of control that applies within a judge's chambers
will not apply on the courthouse sidewalk. 35 The Supreme Court has
grounded this doctrine in the distinction between government as regulator
of individuals' behavior (when scrutiny is at its highest and deference at
its lowest) versus government as the proprietor of its own property, with
an interest in making sure its own speech is heard and understood. 3 6
3 7 some
As in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
property is recognized as being traditionally a "public forum" amenable
to wide-open public discourse, where speech generally cannot be
restricted on the basis of content, such as a park or a street. 38 While the
Supreme Court has not set forth a categorical test for determining what
qualifies as a traditional forum, factors that courts have weighed include
the compatibility of the property with public expressive activity and the

31. Frank D. LoMonte, "The Key Word Is Student": Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the

Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FFRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 311-12 (2013).
32. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
33. LoMonte, supra note 31, at 312.
34. Frank D. LoMonte & Clay Calvert, The Open Mic, Unplugged: Challenges to
Viewpoint-Based Constraintson Public-Comment Periods, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 30-31

(2018).
35. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (applying First Amendment to vacate
convictions of civil-rights protesters who marched, chanted, and carried picket signs outside the
courthouse).

36. See

Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)

("Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than
acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the
heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.").

37. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
38. See ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003).
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public's reasonable expectation of being protected when using the space
for speech. 39
Besides the rather narrow handful of public spaces categorically
recognized as traditional public forums, property can also become a
forum by way of "designation." 40 In determining whether a designated
public forum exists, courts look to the government's policy and practice
to assess whether a discernable intent exists to open the property for
expressive purposes; courts also look to the nature of the property and its
41
compatibility with expressive activity. For property to be regarded as a
designated forum, there must be evidence of an affirmative decision by
the government to commit the property to expressive use, rather than just
42
a passive indifference to occasional expressive use.
Once a piece of property is declared to be a "forum," by either
tradition or designation, any regulation on the content of a speaker's
message must satisfy the "strict scrutiny" standard: The government must
show that the restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental objective, and that it is narrowly tailored to prohibit no
43
more speech than is necessary to accomplish that objective.
Regardless of whether property is a forum by tradition or by
designation, the government cannot selectively afford preference to
certain viewpoints; once the property is made available for one opinion,
it must be accessible on equal terms to all. The Supreme Court has
recognized that selectively excluding speakers from using public
property raises equal protection concerns as well as implicating the First
Amendment: "Selective exclusion from a public forum may not be based
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content

alone.""
39. Id. at 1099-1100 (collecting cases and observing that courts have applied "a jumble of
overlapping factors[]" in assessing when property is so deeply identified as a place for expression
as to qualify as traditional public forum property).
40. See R. George Wright, Public Foraand the Problem of Too Much Speech, 106 KY. L.J.

409, 416 (2017-18).
41. Id. at 416-18 (noting confusion about status and existence of a "non-public forum"
category, in which government is acting as a proprietor rather than a regulator, managing its own
property).
42. "The government does not create a public forum by ...

permitting limited discourse,

but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). Accord Christ's Bride
Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A] past practice of
permitting some expressive activities or 'limited discourse' does not mandate that the government

intended the forum as public.").
43. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 850-51 (2006) (collecting cases and concluding that strictscrutiny analysis is almost invariably fatal to a government regulation).

44. Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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Even in a public forum, the government can enforce reasonable
regulations on the use of property that are both "content neutral" on their
face and are, in practice, applied evenhandedly to all speakers. 45 A
regulation is content neutral if it is "justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech." A classic example of a constitutionally
permissible "time, place, and manner" restriction is a limit on how long
members of the public may occupy the podium when addressing a
government meeting. 46 For instance, a three-minute time limit has been
upheld as a reasonable content-neutral restriction on speakers addressing
a city council hearing. 4 7
Property that is neither traditionally open to public discourse, nor held
open by government designation, is referred to as a "nonpublic forum." 48
In a nonpublic forum, government regulation of speech need be only
reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 49 Even in a nonpublic forum, however,
the government cannot engage in viewpoint-based discrimination.5 0
The Supreme Court explicitly adopted a three-tiered "forum" analysis
in a 1983 decision involving access to employee mailboxes in the front.
office of a public school. 5 1 In that case, Perry Education, an upstart labor
union bidding to dislodge the incumbent labor organization insisted on a
First Amendment right to place recruitment flyers in teachers' mailboxes,
the same access afforded to its competitor.5 2 The Court, however, found
that the boxes were not a "forum" open to general expressive use, but
rather, were limited by their nature to communications about school
business by authorized users. 5 3 Accordingly, non-school organizations
had no constitutional right to insist on using the mailboxes, and there was
no First Amendment violation in limiting access to a subcategory of
official-business speakers. 54
The Court explained in Perry Education that the government could
ration the expressive use of property such as school mailboxes to
"preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
45. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that in a public
forum, regulations on the time, place and manner of speech will be constitutional if they are
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave ample
alternatives of communication).

46. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
47. Id.
48. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity
so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and
are viewpoint neutral.").

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983).

52. Id at 40-41.
53. Id. at 48.
54. Id. at 51.

10
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dedicated."' 5 5 The Court went on to explain that the ability to
discriminate among speakers was necessary for the government to
allocate limited mailbox space to "activities compatible with the intended
purpose of the property."s1
Amplifying the confusion over forum status, courts have recognized
what may be a distinct fourth category of property, or a subset of the
57 In a limited
designated forum, known as a "limited public forum."
public forum, the government has greater latitude to exclude speakers, or
limit discussion topics, in keeping with the purpose for which the forum
was created; in other words, "limited" means that the forum is a forum
only for people whose speech falls into the class of speech for which the
form was created. 58 Hence, a school board can enforce restrictions on the
relevance of comments made during an open-mic period, limiting
59
speakers to addressing subjects within the board's jurisdiction. Contentbased restrictions in a limited public forum are considered to be
reasonable if they are "consistent with preserving the property for the
60
purpose to which it is dedicated."
While it is uncertain how much, if at all, a speaker's rights in a limited
forum are superior to those in a non-forum,61 it seems widely accepted
that, when the government enforces content-based restrictions on speech
in a limited public forum, it must show that those restrictions are tailored
to advance an "important" or "significant" public purpose, while no
62
tailoring is required if the property is not a forum at all.
C. Rosenberger and the Metaphysical Forum
A "forum" typically connotes a physical space, such as the walkways
inside an airport terminal, 63 or a bandstand in a park,' that speakers and
55. Id. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Servi. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S.
114, 129-30 (1981)).
56. Id. at 49.
57. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981) (recognizing university facilities as
a limited public forum set aside for use by students); see also Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc'y v. Cty.

of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 372 F. Supp. 3d 767, 770 (M.D. Pa. 2018) ("One particular area that
has frustrated the courts is how to distinguish between designated and limited public forums.").

58. DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
59. LoMonte & Calvert, supra note 34, at 44-45.

60. DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 967.
61. "The line between the designated 'limited' public forum and the nonpublic forum is
maddeningly slippery, and some would even say non-existent, notwithstanding their linguistically

opposed labels." Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1975, 1990 (2011):
62. See, e.g., City of Dayton v. Esrati, 125 Ohio App. 3d 60 (Ohio App. 1997) (explaining
that in a limited public forum, the First Amendment requires that any content-based restrictions
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, while if the property is a
non-forum, restrictions must only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral).

63. See Int'l Soc'y. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992).
64. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1989).
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performers seek to use as a platform to convey their messages. But the
courts have identified intangible (or "metaphysical") forums, to which all
of the same First Amendment standards and principles apply. 6 5
In 1995, the Supreme Court confronted the case of a public university
that denied a Christian-themed student newspaper, Wide Awake, a
subsidy to cover its printing and distribution costs. 66 A student fee
committee declared Wide Awake ineligible for financial support because
of its overtly religious content, relying on a guideline that disqualified
"religious activities." 67 The student editors sued, but lower courts denied
them relief; the Fourth Circuit found that, while the decision was made
with reference to content, it was justified by the university's need to avoid
excessive entanglement with religion in contravention of the
Establishment Clause. 68 The Supreme Court reversed. 69
The Justices decided that student activity fees constitute a limited
public forum designed to benefit the students who pay into the fund. 70
The Court analogized the university's pool of activity fees to property
reserved for a specific purpose, which allowed the university to lawfully
set boundaries on which groups could access it. 7 1 The Court found that a
university can exclude discussion of certain content to preserve the
forum's limited nature, but cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
when the speaker's subject matter is "otherwise within the forum's
limitations." 7 2 The Court held that the university violated the student
editors' First Amendment rights because "the University does not
exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment
those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints." 73
Thus, under Rosenberger, withholding student activity fees from a
student publication because of the publication's editorial bent, where the
university does not prohibit discussion of the subject matter, amounts to
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 74
65. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805-06 (1985)
(determining that the Combined Federal Campaign fundraising drive constitutes a forum, but that
it is a nonpublic forum because, in setting up a program to enable charities to solicit payroll
deductions from federal employees, the government did not intend to create a vehicle for speech,
but merely a conduit to channel charities' solicitations in a more orderly manner); Lehman v. City

of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974) (defining the relevant forum as a city's program of
selling advertising space aboard public transit buses).
66. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

67. Id. at 827.
68. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 285 (4th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
69. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846.

70. Id. at 830.
71. Id. at 840.

72. Id. at 829-30.
73. Id. at 831.
74. Id.
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The Court returned to the subject of student activity fees and the First
Amendment in 2000, when student plaintiffs sought to prevent the
University of Wisconsin from subsidizing political or ideological
organizations whose views they found unpalatable. 75 The Justices upheld
the constitutionality of the fee system, finding that, so long as fees are
dispensed in a viewpoint-neutral way, the fact that some money finds its
way into the coffers of organizations with divisive political views is of
no consequence. 7 6 The Court remanded for further review the question of
whether the University's system of allowing students to vote on the
activity-fee budget in a campus-wide referendum was, by nature, an
invitation to viewpoint discrimination: "[t]o the extent the referendum
substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would
77
undermine the constitutional protection the program requires."
Significantly, the takeaway from Southworth is that the mere possibility
that voters will award or withhold funding on the basis of a speaker's
viewpoint is enough to render a budgeting mechanism unconstitutional.
D. Forums-dot-com: Government-run Social Media Accounts
The need for clear legal guidance about the government's obligation
to justify closing a forum has become exponentially more acute now that
vast swaths of online real estate are imbued with forum protection. Once
the courts recognized that forum status could apply even when property
is intangible-or even when the government uses property owned by
others 7 8 -it was not a stretch to apply the forum doctrine to a Twitter or
Facebook account where government officials communicate with the
public.
Social media is increasingly the tool of choice for government
agencies at all levels, from the White House to the smallest local police
department, to share information with a mass audience quickly and
79
Facebook, the most
without the expense of traditional publishing.
than 1.5 billion
more
with
popular U.S.-based social media network
80 is so widely used by public entities that
active daily users worldwide,
the company has enacted a targeted set of supplemental terms and

75.
76.
77.
78.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 235.
See First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114,

1122 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[F]orum analysis does not require that the government have a possessory
interest in or title to the underlying land. Either government ownership or regulation is sufficient
for a First Amendment forum of some kind to exist.").
79. John Carlo Bertot et al., The impact of polices on government social media usage:
Issues, challenges, and recommendations,29 GOV'T INFO. Q. 30, 31 (2012)..

80. Company Info: Stats,
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019).

FACEBOOK NEWSROOM,

https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
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conditions specifically applying to pages maintained for the benefit of
government agencies.81
Professor Lyrissa Lidsky is credited with forecasting the difficult First
Amendment line-drawing choices that would arise as government
agencies began to invite, and take part in, public discourse on social
media platforms. 82 In her 2011 article, Public Forum 2.0, Professor
Lidsky anticipated the challenges in trying to characterize the forum
status of the unique "property" that is a social media page-"property"
that exists at the whim of a private host, in which the government has no
real "ownership," but which serves the same function as yesterday's
paper newsletters or cork bulletin boards. 83 The article anticipated
complications resulting from recognizing government-maintained social
media pages as forums-agencies might hesitate to engage on social
media at all, for fear of being constitutionally obligated to tolerate
disruptive speakers-and found the existing forum doctrine to be illsuited to the interactive pages of Facebook groups, where government
and citizen speech coexist side-by-side. 84 Since that prophetic article, the
need to clarify the legal status of government-run Facebook and Twitter
accounts has only intensified, as social media becomes the primary way
in which public officials reach their constituents. 85
In recent years, the forum nature of Twitter and Facebook accounts
was squarely at issue in the First Amendment claims brought by speakers
who were blocked from posting comments to, or reading, pages
maintained by government officials. 8 6 The most prominent of these,
Knight First Amendment Institute of Columbia University v. Trump,87
81. See Government Terms: Amended Terms for Federal, State and Local Governments in

the United States, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms_pagesgov.php (last visited Nov.
10, 2019).
82. See Clay Calvert, The Government Speech Doctrine in Walker's Wake: Early Rifts and

&

Reverberationson Free Speech, Viewpoint Discrimination,and Offensive Expression, 25 WM.
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1239, 1245 (2017).

83. Lidsky, supra note 61, at 1980.
84. Lidsky, supra note 61, at 2024.
85. See Katie Blevins & Kearston L. Wesner, Access to Government Officials in the Age of
Social Media, 1 J. Civic INFO. 30, 38 (2019) ("Being able to view and respond to policy
announcements and statements associated with the officials' duties is critical to participatory
government."). In a rare foray into online speech, the Supreme Court recognized that social
networking sites function as "the modern public square" and that they "provide perhaps the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard." Packingham

v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
86. See, e.g., Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230
(2d Cir. 2019) (President Trump's blocking Twitter users from his account); Robinson v. Hunt

Cty., 921 F.3d 440, 452 (5th Cir. 2019) (Hunt County Sheriff's Office's blocking a Facebook user
from its account); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 676 (4th Cir. 2019) (Loudon County Board
of Supervisors Chair's blocking a Facebook user from her page).
87. 928 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2019)
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presented especially challenging facts, because the Twitter account at
issue, @RealDonaldTrump, was created in March 2009, nearly eight
years before Trump was elected to public office, and originated as a
promotional vehicle for his personal views. 88 Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals readily concluded that the account became
a designated public forum by virtue of the way it functioned during
Trump's presidency beginning in 2017.89 The judges noted that publicly
salaried White House staff members helped manage the account, and that
President Trump used the account to transact official business: "The
Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the
President, upon assuming office, repeatedly used the Account as an
official vehicle for governance and made its interactive features
90
accessible to the public without limitation."
9
Although the consensus of the courts is not unanimous, 1 the Second
92
Circuit's holding aligns with rulings from Virginia, Wisconsin93 and
9 4 in concluding that a government-maintained social media
Missouri
page, on which the public is permitted to post comments, constitutes a
limited or designated public forum. Because social media pages lack the
durability of traditional government property-in a matter of seconds, the
accountholder can disable or discontinue a page, delete any or all
postings, or change its settings to exclude public interaction-a formerly
"designated" forum might be closed, or cease to exist, with a few taps on
a touch-screen. Because so many more designated public forums have
come into existence as governments migrate to social media for officialbusiness communications, it is more important than ever for government
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 231.
Id. at 237.
Id.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1011-13 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (declining

claim for injunctive relief brought by citizens blocked from Kentucky governor's Facebook page,
because Facebook is a privately owned communication channel and the governor, like any user,

may decide which messages to read and which to ignore).
92. See Davison, 912 F. 3d at 683-85 (affirming district court's determination that
Facebook page maintained by chair of county commission for official business communications
and made accessible for public interaction became a designated public forum, from which the

plaintiff could not be excluded based on his critical views).
93. See One Wis. Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 954, 956 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (finding
that the First Amendment prohibited state legislators from selectively blocking only liberal critics
from reading and responding to their official Twitter posts because the "interactive portions" of
those accounts constituted a designated public forum).

94. See Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *6 (W.D. Mo.
Aug. 16, 2019) (following Second Circuit's Knight decision and deeming Twitter account
controlled by state legislator to be a public forum); see also Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:1 7-cv-00296-

JAW, 2018 WL 4134628, at *16-17 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2018) (declining to follow Kentucky's
Morgan ruling and denying governor's motion to dismiss First Amendment claim brought by

critics blocked from accessing his official Facebook page).
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decision makers to have clear judicial guidance about when a page may
be deactivated.
II. A FUNNY THING HAPPENED: WHEN GOVERNMENT CLOSES A FORUM
In a traditional public forum, such as a park or public street, it is wellestablished that government may not close off all expressive use, unless
the property fundamentally changes in character so as to lose what made
it a forum in the first place (for instance, a park is sold to a private housing
developer). 95 In a case involving an attempt to declare swaths of public
sidewalks outside the U.S. Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C.,
to be off-limits to protest marches and demonstrations, the Court called it
"presumptively impermissible" to destroy a traditional public forum by
re-labeling it legislatively, elaborating:
Traditional public forum property occupies a special
position in terms of First Amendment protection and will
not lose its historically recognized character for the reason
that it abuts government property that has been dedicated
to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor
may the government transform the character of the property
by the expedient of including it within the statutory
definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum
parcel of property. 9 6
A designated public forum is not quite so durable, but just how durable
remains in question. The Supreme Court has never confronted the issue
of when, if ever, a government agency's decision to close a designated
public forum could give rise to a First Amendment claim by a would-be
speaker. 9 7 Nevertheless, some lower courts have extrapolated from dicta
in a handful of Supreme Court cases to conclude that no such claim exists.
The starting point is Perry Education.98 There, the Court included
what reads like a throwaway observation in the course of explaining the
public forum doctrine, which over time has taken on outsized
95. Jordan E. Pratt, An Open and Shut Case: Why (andHow) the Eleventh Circuit Should

Restrainthe Government's Forum Closure Power, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1487, 1498 (2011). See also
Jacobson v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 882 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that
protesters excluded from roadside near Border Patrol checkpoints were entitled to discovery to
test government's claim that character of roadside had been sufficiently transformed through
Border Patrol's restrictive use to deprive it of traditional public forum status).

96. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). See also ACLU of Nev. v. City of
Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Grace's presumption against the
closure of traditional public forum property, where a city tried to restrict speech in an open-air
pedestrian mall that had been fashioned out of public streets, a quintessential public forum).
97. See Timothy Zick, Property As/And Constitutional Settlement, 104 Nw. U. L. REV.

1361, 1411 (2010) ("The Supreme Court has never addressed a public forum closure.").
98. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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significance: "Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the
open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
99
standards as apply in a traditional public forum." Since PerryEducation
was not about the closure of a forum at all-the teacher mailboxes were
determined to be a nonpublic forum, to which no outside speaker could
00
stake a claim-the passage is entirely dicta,1 yet it has become the
wobbly foundation on which a growing body of First Amendment
caselaw is built.101 Perry Education's reasoning, in turn, relied on the
Supreme Court's 1968 ruling in United States v. O'Brien,102 in which the
Court declined to second-guess Congress' reason for criminalizing the
destruction of a military draft card, finding that the statute was facially
10 3
neutral and justified by nonspeech concerns.
As discussed in Section V, infra, neither O'Brien nor PerryEducation
can legitimately be read for the broad proposition that a claim of
retaliatory forum closure is unreviewable. Nevertheless, this notion has
taken hold in a handful of post-Perry Education decisions, depriving
speakers of recourse even when the cause-and-effect between their
speech and the revocation of forum status is undisputed.
A. The Fourth Circuit View: Government's Motive Irrelevant
1. The City of Lexington Case: Closure in Response to Divisive
Political Speech
In recent years, a handful of courts have afforded government
agencies a free hand to close access to a designated public forum, even in
the face of evidence that the closure was motivated by distaste for a
particular speaker's message. The most prominent of these involved the
display of banners hung from lampposts in the city of Lexington,
Virginia.104
In January 2011, a Southern heritage organization, the Sons of
Confederate Veterans ("SCV"), held a parade through Lexington to
commemorate the births of Civil War commanders Robert E. Lee and
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson.1 0 5 As part of the commemoration, the
99. Id. at 46.
100. See id. Indeed, in the Perry Education case, the parties agreed that the internal mail
system could lawfully be closed to all outsiders, see id., so that question was not before the Court

at all.
101. See Pratt, supra note 95, at 1503 ("[A]n expansive interpretation of the forum closure
power recognized in Perry is improvident insofar as it might permit the government to close a
forum in retaliation against a speaker's viewpoint.").

102. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
103. Id. at 375.
104. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 226 (4th
Cir. 2013).
105. Id.
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SCV obtained permission from the city to hang its Confederate flag from
city light poles, a privilege the city had afforded to other community
organizations. In response to negative feedback from community
members incensed by the flags' display, Lexington's city council voted
to discontinue the practice of making lampposts available for community
displays-in effect, closing the forum.1 0 Hoping to make its display an
annual event, the SCV organization sued, alleging that the closure was
viewpoint-motivated.1 07
The Fourth Circuit had no difficulty categorizing the city-owned
lampposts as a designated public forum, noting that private speakers had
been permitted to use the posts for expressive purposes from 1994 until
2011.108 Nevertheless, the court found no First Amendment violation in
the decision to rescind public access. 109
While acknowledging that the decisionmaker's motive is often a
factor in deciding whether a facially neutral policy violates the
Constitution, the court said First Amendment cases involving the
management of public forum property belong in their own category." 0
The court held that to require the city to indefinitely continue accepting
banners from outside groups could produce the "absurd" result of the city
being crowded out from using its own property, to carry its own message,
if a speaker insisted on occupying the space:
A government is entitled to close a designated public forum to all
speech.... [I]t appears that the City experimented with private
speakers displaying flags on the City's standards, and that effort
turned out to be troublesome. It was entitled, under the controlling
principles, to alter that policy.'
2. The Underpinnings of City of Lexington: How Courts Concluded
that Motive is Irrelevant
Like the handful of other forum-closure cases, in which courts have
eschewed inquiring into the decision-maker's motivation, the City of
Lexington case began with the throwaway passage from PerryEducation,
which the Fourth Circuit characterized as "recognizing that government
is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum."1 1 2 That
is an accurate description of Perry Education, so far as it goes-but it
106. Id. at 226-27.
107. Id. at 227.
108. Id. at 230.
109. Id. at 232-33.
110. Id. at 232.
111. Id.
112. Id at 231 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)).
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requires a leap from "not required to retain" to "close for any reason, even
a viewpoint-discriminatory reason." For good measure, the Fourth
Circuit relied on dicta from a Third Circuit case, United States v.
4
Bjerke," 3 which quoted the Perry Education dicta.1 Like Perry
Education, Bjerke involved a nonpublic forum not analogous to the
Lexington lampposts.1 15 Each of the other forum-closure cases cited in
City of Lexington likewise involved a nonpublic forum, and each of them
quoted the dicta from Perry Education for the proposition-also dicta
116
Indeed, each
that the government may close a designated forum at will.
public
designated
a
that
case that is commonly cited for the conclusion
forum may be closed for even a retaliatory reason says no such thing.
Take the Seventh Circuit's oft-cited Grossbaum v. IndianapolisMarion County Bldg. Authority case,"' relied on by the district court in
118
discussed in detail infra at Sec.
the (now-overruled) Koala decision,
IV. In Grossbaum, the Seventh Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of
the role of the government's motive when speakers allege retaliation by
1 19 The Grossbaum court upheld
way of denied access to public property.
a municipal policy prohibiting displays in the lobby of a city-owned
building-a space that the court deemed to be a nonpublic forum, where
20
regulations need be only reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.1 The city
banned all displays in response to a successful constitutional challenge to
a prior version of the city's policy, which prohibited only religious
displays.' 2 The plaintiff in that original suit, who sought to use the lobby
for a Jewish holiday display, alleged that the across-the-board ban was

113. 796 F.3d 643 (3d Cir. 1986).
114. See id. at 647. The Third Circuit's citation to Perrywas a mere passing remark included
in boilerplate discussion of the legal standards corresponding to each category of forum property.
115. See id. The Bjerke case involved regulations on solicitation on the sidewalk outside a

U.S. Post Office, which the Third Circuit-following the Supreme Court's lead in United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)--determined to be a nonpublic forum..
116. See Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that general
delivery mail service is a nonpublic forum and therefore, under a reasonableness standard, the
government may freely discontinue offering general mail delivery services to homeless people

without permanent addresses); Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d
Cir. 2004) (finding that waiting room in welfare office was nonpublic forum from which solicitors
could freely be excluded). The Turner case is inapplicable for the additional reason that it involves
the selective exclusion of speakers-nonprofit advocacy organizations-from a nonpublic forum,
rather than the total closure of a limited public forum.

117. 100 F.3d 1287 (7th Cir. 1996).
118. Koala v. Khosla, No. 16cv1296 JM(BLM), 2017 WL 784183, at *7-9 (S.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2017), rev'd and vacated, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019).
119. 100 F.3d at 1292-96 (considering under what circumstances the motives of government
actors are relevant in a constitutional analysis).

120. Id. at 1298-99.
121. Id. at 1290.
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enacted in retaliation for his having sued over the religious-based ban that
was held unconstitutional.1 22
The Grossbaum court declined to entertain the retaliation theory. 123
The judges drew a categorical distinction between an executive act
targeting a specific individual speaker (which can be unlawfully
retaliatory), versus a legislative enactment of general applicability
(which, in the court's view, cannot). 124 The court focused on the effect of
the rule in question, closing access to the forum entirely, in a way that
equally disadvantaged all speakers,12 5 and compared that to the City of
Jackson's decision, a generation earlier, to close public swimming pools
to avoid desegregating them, upheld by the Supreme Court in Palmer v.
Thompson. 12 6 In the Koala case, involving withdrawal of student-fee
support for campus publications, the district court summarized
Grossbaum as supporting the notion that "in a First Amendment Free
Speech case motive plays no role in assessing a content-neutral regulation
of speech in a limited public forum."1 2 7 But that is overstated in two
respects: First, Grossbaum's discussion of forums other than nonpublic
forums is dicta, and second, Grossbaum limits its rationale to the analysis
of a "prospective, generally applicable rule." 12 8
As an example of the type of government action that remains
amenable to a retaliation challenge, the Grossbaum court posited a
scenario where, instead of forbidding everyone from posting displays in
the lobby, the city "prohibited all lobby displays by groups that had put
up displays during the previous December," which would carry the taint
of retaliatory targeting.1 2 9 "[G]overnment officials cannot," the
Grossbaum court concluded, "escape a retaliation claim simply by
dressing up individualized government action to look like a general
rule."13 0 In other words, even the case that most strongly suggests that
motive is irrelevant when a government agency closes a forum does not
end up shutting that door very tightly.
As in the Grossbaum opinion, the hoary Palmer case lives on in a
handful of forum-closure cases, despite its doubtful vitality. Palmer
provided crucial support for the decision to consider the decisionmaker's
retaliatory motive in Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Regional

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1296.
124. Id. at 1295.
125. See id. at 1298.
126. 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971), cited in Grossbaum, 100 F.3d at 1293.
127. Koala v. Khosla, No. 16cv1296 JM(BLM), 2017 WL 784183, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2017), rev'd and vacated, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019).
128. Grossbaum, 100 F.3d at 1295.

129. Id.
130. Id.
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Library.13 1 In that case, a public library in rural South Georgia removed
a table from the lobby, where publishers had been afforded the
opportunity to leave free publications for the public, specifically in
response to patron complaints about one of the news publications, The
Gay Guardian.13 2 The district judge declined to recognize the
13 The court relied, in part, on the
newspaper's First Amendment claim.
reasoning of the Palmerpool-closing case to conclude that the motive for
closing a forum is irrelevant "[a]bsent any evidence that a facially neutral
closure (or partial closure) policy bears the effect (in contrast to intent) of
singling out an 'unwanted' speaker[.]"1 34
Though it is less than two decades old, the Gay Guardian decision
looks timeworn under the bright light of contemporary scrutiny. In
inflammatory language, scarcely at home in a judicial opinion, the court
invokes the bogeyman of the North American Man/Boy Love
Association, or NAMBLA, to suggest that if newspapers catering to gay
audiences are allowed into libraries, twelve-year-olds will soon be
35 The
gleefully biking home with literature advocating pedophilia.1
opinion goes on to speculate that the library's liability insurance
premiums might rise because of the concerns that "violent 'straights'
could lurk about waiting to 'straighten out' patrons who browse free
copies of The Gay Guardian," a speculatively slender justification on
36
which to hang a First Amendment ruling.1
The Gay Guardian ruling quotes extensively from-but misses the
heart of-a Maine district court's ruling dismissing the First Amendment
claims of two would-be broadcasters denied access to the airwaves when
37
their city council temporarily shut down the public-access station.1
There, the court afforded the city discretion to temporarily close the
channel-a designated public forum-while consulting with counsel to
formulate new standards for the channel in response to an earlier First
Amendment lawsuit.138 But, crucially, the court indicated that proof of
viewpoint-based retaliation against specific speakers would make it a
different case: "Certainly if [the city] were to shut down the public access
channel temporarily so as to stifle discussion of a particular current
controversy, with plans to reopen the channel later after the controversy
had subsided, or so as to stifle the particular speech of this plaintiff, that
shutdown would be speaker and viewpoint censorship and would violate
131.
132.
133.
134.

235 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2002).
Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1375-76 (emphasis in original).

135. See id. at 1371.

136. Id. at 1375.
137. Rhames v. City of Biddeford, 204 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50-53 (D. Me. 2002).
138. Id. at 53.
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the First Amendment under any analysis."1 39 That, of course, was exactly
the case in Gay Guardian,where everyone agreed that excluding the gaythemed content of the newspaper was the library's purpose in closing the
forum., 4 0
More to the point legally, Gay Guardianis not really a "public forum
closing" case. The court, after equivocating about the status of the lobby
and the literature table, concluded that the lobby area fell into a neverbefore-recognized "hybrid" category between a limited public forum and
a nonpublic forum, in which the government gets greater latitude than in
a case involving an actual forum. 14 1 Nor is Gay Guardian a case about
the irrelevance of motive. The court's discussion is, indeed, about nothing
but motive.14 2 The judge extensively discusses, and at times fancifully
speculates about, all of the reasons a public library might not want to
continue offering an all-comers literature table. 14 3 Gay Guardian, in the
end, turns out to be about the reasonableness of the decisionmaker's
plausible non-retaliatory motive, and about the accessibility of alternative
means of communication-not about the irrelevance of motive.144
Besides these frequently cited cases, a handful of other rulings suggest
(though do not squarely hold) that the motive for discontinuing a
designated public forum is beyond the purview of courts to review. 14 5 In
a dispute over allowing the public to display religious imagery in the
Georgia Capitol rotunda, the 11th Circuit suggested. that, if the State of
Georgia feared being held liable for an Establishment Clause violation,
the State could instead close the rotunda to all speakers.1 4 6 Similarly, the
First Circuit, in a nonpublic forum case involving access to advertising
spaces on city buses, stated in dicta that, even if the advertising program
had operated as a designated public forum, the city would have been free
139. Id. at 51, 53 ("It is true that a city should not be able to shut down a park or a bandshell
temporarily so as to avoid a particular speech or a particular concert-that is not a viewpoint
neutral measure and violates the First Amendment. But a city should be able to close a public park
for six months-because of sewage problems or crime or erosion-without worrying whether the
shutdown is narrow enough to avoid undue impact on people who want to speak in the park and
whether there are ample alternative channels for them."). Notably, the Rhames court also relied
in part on the reasoning of the Palmer pool-closing case, which the judge described as furnishing
an "interesting analogy." Id at 50 n.4.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Gay Guardian,235 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1369-71.

144. See id at 1376, 1378 (concluding that avoiding entanglement in controversy is a
legitimate motive for eliminating a designated forum, and that the plaintiff had alternative means

of getting out his message, including through publicity in other media outlets).
145. See, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1394(1 lth Cir. 1993); Ridley
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 77 (1st Cir. 2004); DiLoreto v. Down Unified Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
146. Miller, 5 F.3d at 1394.
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to close it at any time.' 47 And, in a dispute over a school district's refusal
to accept an advertisement on the outfield wall of a baseball stadium
depicting the Ten Commandments, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
completely discontinuing advertising would be a "constitutionally
permissible solution" to avoid being accused of selectively
discriminating against religious speakers.14
But even these cases do not forswear inquiry into the government's
motive for enacting a regulation. In Miller, for instance, the court
weighed the state's proffered justification-avoiding an Establishment
Clause claim by viewers who believed tolerating a display of religious
speech lent an impermissible state endorsement to the speech-and found
49
it inadequate to justify a content-based restriction on speech.1
B. The Better View: Retaliatory Closure Unconstitutional
Only a small handful of cases have resulted in an outright ruling that
the government may not close a designated public forum if the motivation
is to silence a disagreeable speaker.'" 0 The most explicit of these is ACTUP v. Walp,1 5 1 a First Amendment challenge to the Pennsylvania state
legislature's decision to shut off public access to the visitors' gallery at
the House of Representatives chamber. 5 2 The move indisputably was
motivated to prevent a particular disfavored group, AIDS-awareness
activists, who had been demonstrating outside the Capitol, from gaining
access to the gallery during the governor's address to the legislature,
53 Determining that
fearing that the activists would disrupt the speech.'
the gallery was a limited public forum, the district court found the closure
was unconstitutional: "Here, the government admits that the closing of
the gallery, though closed to everyone, was aimed at preventing the ACTUP members access. This is a content-based restriction, and thus any
time, place, and manner limits used to carry out the restriction are

invalid."'1 4

Similarly, a district court in Missouri found that a Ku Klux Klan
chapter in Kansas City could challenge the city's decision to delete a
public-access television channel specifically to allow the cable franchiseholder to avoid airing a Klan-produced talk show that it would otherwise

147.
148.
149.
150.
Ku Klux
151.
152.
153.
154.

Ridley, 390 F.3d at 77.
DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 970.
5 F.3d at 1394-95.
See ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1289 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Mo. Knights of the
Klan v. Kan. City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
755 F. Supp. 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id. at 1289 (citation omitted).
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be obligated to carry.' 55 The court found the decision legally
indistinguishable from a decision to selectively exclude an unwanted
speaker based on content or viewpoint, and applied a similarly skeptical
review:

[T]he Constitution forbids a state to enforce exclusions from
a forum generally open to the public even if it was not
required to create the forum in the first place. Whether the
exclusion is accomplished by individual censorship or
elimination of the forum is inconsequential; the result is the
same. A state may only eliminate a designated public forum
if it does so in a manner consistent with the First
Amendment.1 56

While no circuit court has squarely addressed the issue, the First
Circuit has indicated, in dicta, that a First Amendment claim can lie
where a government agency closes a formerly public forum to shut down
disfavored speech: "Once the state has created a forum, it may not
condition access to the forum on the content of the message to be
communicated, or close the forum solely because it disagrees with the
messages being communicated in it." 157 But in that case, challenging a
public university's purportedly retaliatory decision to stop subsidizing
student legal services, the court declined to find that a legal-aid clinic
represents a "forum" for expression.1 58 Rather, the court treated the case
as a matter of "subsidized speech," and held that the government had a
freer hand to discontinue financially supporting speech than it does to
close a forum.1 59
More commonly, courts have inquired into the decisionmaker's
motive when a traditional, rather than designated, public forum is closed
to speech. For example, a district court in Michigan looked beyond the
facial neutrality of the decision to the government's invidious purpose in
a case brought by anti-abortion protesters who were denied access to their
former protest zone near an abortion clinic.' 60 The court found that the
protesters could mount a First Amendment challenge to the city's
155. Mo. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kan. City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (W.D. Mo.
1989).
156. Id. at 1352 (citations omitted).
157. Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. Of Trustees of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 (1st Cir.
1989).
158. Id. at 477.
159. See id. at 480. The UMass decision predated the Supreme Court's 1995 declaration in
Rosenbergerthat student activity fees constitute a limited public forum, and the First Circuit did
not analyze the fee system in that way. The plaintiff's claim. was that the legal-services
organization, not the fee system, represented the closed forum. After Rosenberger, the continued
vitality of the UMass case is doubtful.

160. Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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decision to deed away ownership of a formerly public walkway with the
express purpose of depriving the protesters of a right to use the
property. 61 The city relied on the Palmer pool-closing case to argue that
62 but the court was
its closure of the forum was unreviewable,1
unpersuaded. 163 While the city's conveyance of the property was facially
content-neutral, and no future demonstrator could claim a First
Amendment entitlement to use the now-private area, the court found that
the decision was in fact content-based because only anti-abortion activists
used the space and only they would be affected by its loss.1"4 Although
cases involving traditional public forums may be distinguishable because
there is clear Supreme Court precedent disfavoring the closure of
traditional public forums, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has
said the same First Amendment standards apply to public forums whether
65
they attain that status by tradition or by designation.'
III. AN UNFUNNY THING HAPPENED: THE KOALA CASE
Advocating for the First Amendment rights of silenced speakers, at
times, requires adeptness at nose-holding. Breakthroughs in the law of
66 Klansmen, 167
free expression owe their existence to pornographers,1
anti-gay religious extremists,168 and purveyors of graphic dog-fighting
videos.1 69 Alongside the aforementioned cases, the editorial content of
the long-running UC-San Diego shock-humor magazine, The Koala, may
seem like tame stuff.
The Koala is a publication that intentionally sets out to push
boundaries of taste, judgment, maturity, and decency.1 7 0 In that objective,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1201.
See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that a public

figure may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
publication of a parody portraying respondent engaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse).

167. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) (holding a Virginia Statute, which
establishes as prima facie evidence of a felony offense cross-burning with the intent to intimidate
a person or group of persons, violates the First Amendment).

168. See Synder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (finding the First Amendment protected
Westboro Baptist parishioners, who traveled to picket the funeral of a Marine Lance Corporal,

from tort liability).
169. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010) (holding a statute which
made it a crime to knowingly create, sell, or possess a depiction of animal cruelty was overbroad
under the First Amendment).
170. See New UCSD racial incident sparks rage, confrontation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Feb. 20, 2010, 12:35AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-new-ucsd-racial-

incident-sparks-rage-confrontation-2010feb20-htmlstory.html.
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it succeeds rousingly. The magazine and its since-shuttered, closedcircuit affiliate, Koala TV, were denounced in 2010 for outlandish racial
stereotyping in promoting a "ghetto-themed" fraternity party (the
"Compton Cookout"). 171 In 2014, the magazine provided "coverage" of
a fictional "Sexual Assault Olympics" competition among fraternities:
"Whichever frat has the most points at the end of the year wins the
'Golden Roofie' trophy and a six-month supply of morning-after
pills." 172
Following the 2010 outcry, the president of UCSD's student
government association shut down the television station and froze
funding for all student media organizations, acknowledging that the
actions were a direct response to The Koala's print and broadcast
content.1 7 3 Several weeks later, the student government association
vacated the freeze, and The Koala resumed receiving its student activity
fee subsidy. 174
The 2010 uproar over The Koala's outlandish content was the
backdrop for the events of 2015, which finally provoked UCSD
administrators to find a way to cut off the magazine's (relatively small)
subsidy from student fees.1 75 In its November 2015 issue, The Koala
crudely satirized the nationwide trend of recognizing "safe spaces" on
college campuses where people from traditionally marginalized and
disempowered communities can express themselves without fear of
judgment from their peers. 176 In The Koala's parody version of events,
the university announced the creation of a "dangerous space" where
people could come to be bombarded with racial, religious and genderbased epithets, each of which the magazine supplied in graphic detail. 17 7
UCSD administrators decided this went a step too far. Two days after The
Koala hit the news racks, the president's office issued a statement sternly
denouncing the issue's "offensive and hurtful language." 17
That same evening, UCSD's student Senate, known as Associated
Students, held its regularly scheduled business meeting, where the vice
chancellor for student affairs read the statement upbraiding The Koala to
the assemblage. 17 9 At that meeting, and following the vice chancellor's
171. Id.
172. UCSD Frats Compete in the "Sexual Assault Olympics," 96 THE KOALA 1, at 9,
https://thekoala.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-FA-I.pdf.
173. Kerry L. Monroe, Purpose and Effects: Viewpoint-Discriminatory
Designated Public Forum, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 985, 986 (2011).

Closure of a

174. Id.
175. Koala v. Khosla, No. 16cv1296 JM(BLM), 2016 WL 6441470, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1,
2016) [hereinafter Koala 1].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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presentation, the Senate introduced and passed a previously undiscussed
regulation, "the Media Act," declaring that no student organization could
80
receive student activity fees to subsidize a print publication.1 In a form
of collateral damage, four student publications besides The Koala also
lost funding, including a journal showcasing undergraduate student
18
research and a student-produced fashion magazine. 1
A. District Court Rulings
The Koala's First Amendment case made its first appearance in
federal district court in November 2016, with the plaintiffs seeking a
preliminary injunction restraining the university from giving effect to the
Senate's media-funding policy.1 8 2 The magazine's case did not go well.
U.S. District Judge Jeffrey T. Miller first determined that the student
editors' claims were precluded by the 11th Amendment to the extent that
they sought an order from a federal court compelling a state agency to
fund a discretionary program. 8 3 Getting to the core First Amendment
issue, the judge then turned to defining the scope of the limited public
forum at issue, and concluded that the forum was properly understood as
"Associated Students' funding of student print publications."184 The court
cited the Supreme Court's Cornelius for the proposition that the scope of
18 5
the form depends on what the speaker is claiming a right to use. With
that understanding, the court determined that discontinuing financial
support for all print publications was both content-neutral and viewpoint86
neutral, because it disadvantaged all publications equally.' But the court
did not, at that juncture, categorize what the university did as the closure
88
of a forum,' 8 7 an issue that would arise later.1 Finding that The Koala
was unlikely to succeed on the merits of a First Amendment claim, the
89
court denied relief.1

180. Id.
181. See The UCSD Guardian View on A.S. Defunding: Student Media or Nah, THE USCD
GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2015), http://ucsdguardian.org/2015/11/24/the-ucsd-guardian-view-on-a-sdefunding-student-media-or-nah/.

182. Koala I, 2016 W L 6441470, at *1.
183. Id. at *3-4.
184. Id. at *5.

185. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801
(1985)).
186. Id. at *6 (relying by distinction on the Supreme Court's Rosenberger, where the court

found that a subset of religious-themed publications were singled out for selective disqualification
from eligibility for student activity fees).
187. Id. at *5-6.
188. See Koala v. Khosla, No. 16cv1296 JM(BLM), 2017 WL 784183, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2017), rev'd andvacated, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Koala II].
189. Koala 1, 2016 WL 6441470, at *6.
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The court gave no weight to The Koala's introduction of unfavorable
comments about the magazine made by Senate members and university
administrators accompanying the November 18 vote, which in the
plaintiff's view tainted the vote with retaliatory animus: "Plaintiff fails to
cite legal authorities where the motivation, and not the conduct, of some
government actors . .. is determinative of First Amendment issues in
[the] context of a limited public forum."' 90 The court did not cite any
countervailing authority, but instead, pointed to the continued ability of
"a computer-literate student body" to obtain access to the magazine's
online edition, which was not subsidized by the UCSD printing grant.1 9 1
A few months later, the case was back before Judge Miller on its
merits.1 9 2 In that decision ("Koala IT'), the court dealt squarely with the
issue that Koala Ionly hinted at: If funding for student publications is the
forum, can a university close that forum at will, even if the closure is
motivated by distaste for one particular publication's content? 93 The
court decided that the answer is "yes."' 94 Distinguishing the more
selective, content-based exclusion in Rosenberger, the court concluded
"there is no doubt that the elimination of funding for all print publications
is viewpoint neutral." 195 Once again quoting the dicta in Perry, the U.S.
District Court for the Sothern District of California relied on the Ninth
Circuit's Currier v. Potter for the proposition that "in the case of a
designated public forum, the government may close the forum whenever
it wants." 196 The court went on to discount The Koala editors' evidence
of an invidious motive by Senate decisionmakers targeting The Koala on
the basis of viewpoint, finding no proof of a causal connection between
UCSD officials' viewpoint-based criticism of the magazine and the
senators' votes. 19 7

The opinion describes the Media Act as "a content neutral policy of
general applicability affecting all [student organizations] seeking media
publication funds."1 98 While that is one way to look at it-a way that
makes the act fit within the scope of what O'Brien suggests is
unreviewable-it is not the only way. It is also possible to look at the
decision as selectively denying a handful of student organizations the
ability to compete for student activity fees for the sole reason that they
190. Id.
191. Id. at *6 n.2.
192. See generallyKoala 1/, 2017 WL 784183.

193. Id. at *4.
194. Id. at *7.
195. Id. at *5.

196. Id. (citing Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (9th Cir. 2004)).
197. Id. at *6-7. The Court also notes "the precise definition [of the forum] is less
determinative than whether the Media Act is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the
purpose of the forum." Id at *4 n.3.

198. Id. at *8.
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plan to use the money to publish their views. Did the university really
close a forum, or did it selectively exclude a subclass of speakers from a
forum? This uncertainty set the stage for appellate review.
B. The Ninth Circuit Ruling
The Koala case reached the Ninth Circuit against a backdrop of
ambiguous First Amendment precedent. The Ninth Circuit has given
contradictory indications about the relevance of motivation in publicforum cases.1 99 The Currier case,2 0 0 relied on by the district court,
indicated in dicta that the government may freely close a designated
forum at any time 2 0 1-- an assertion that the Ninth Circuit subsequently
cited in a failed First Amendment challenge to a California ordinance
2 02
But other Ninth Circuit cases
restricting banners across public streets.
v. City ofLos Angeles,2 03 the
Gerritsen
In
point in the opposite direction.
court found that a plaintiff could challenge what he believed to be the
retaliatory enactment of a city prohibition on hand billing in the portion
of the public park where he had been handing out flyers critical of the
20
Mexican government. 204 And in UnitedStates v. Griefen, 1 the courtwhile rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a regulation closing off
portions of a national forest that anti-logging activists had been using for
protests-recognized that, in other contexts, the government's reason for
closing a forum could be decisive:
Our holding does not imply that an order that closes a public
forum is sacrosanct. Should it appear that the true purpose of
such an order was to silence disfavored speech or speakers,
or that the order was not narrowly tailored to the realities of
the situation, or that it did not leave open alternative avenues

199. See Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Griefen, 200
F.3d 1256, 1265 (9th Cir. 2000); Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F. 2d 570, 580 (9th Cir.
1993).
200. Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2004).
201. Id. at 728.
202. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th
Cir. 2006) (relying on Currierfor the proposition "that the government may close a designated
public forum 'whenever it wants'"). There, too, the discussion was dicta. The plaintiffs were
challenging a version of the city ordinance that selectively excluded certain speakers from hanging
banners across city streets, not a subsequent forum-closing ordinance that excluded all speakersa decision that mooted the challenge to the earlier, superseded ordinance. See generally id at

1029-32.
203. 994 F. 2d 570 (9th Cir. 1993) (Because a park is a traditional public forum, the Gerritsen
case is of only persuasive value as to designated forums.).

204. Id. at 580.
205. 200 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 2000).
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for communication, the federal courts are capable of taking
prompt and measurably appropriate action. 2 0
In the Koala case, the Ninth Circuit could have straightened out this
confusing tangle of non-binding hints-but avoided conclusively doing
so.
The court reinstated several of The Koala's First Amendment claims,
finding that the district court acted too precipitously in declining to
consider whether enactment of the Media Act was a viewpoint-motivated
attempt to silence or punish the editors' speech. 2 07 Apart from the forum
question, the court found that the magazine stated an actionable claim
under the First Amendment's press clause, because government subsidies
were alleged to have been. conditioned on the publication's viewpoint. 20 8
Turning to the forum issue, the judges acknowledged Ninth Circuit
precedent asserting that government may close a designated or limited
forum "whenever it chooses." 2 09 But the Koala court avoided deciding
the central issue raised by the speakers-whether inquiry into the
decisionmaker's motive is foreclosed even when there is evidence that
the closure was viewpoint-motivated retaliation-because the court
found that the trial judge erred in identifying the boundaries of the forum
as "funding for print publications." 2 10 The Ninth Circuit found that the
student activity fee could not be carved up by legal fiction into
subcategories so that a discriminatory selective exclusion from a forum
is transformed into the-seemingly unreviewable-closure of a forum. 211
Having concluded that the case was not a "forum closure" case at all, the
court had no occasion to decide whether the Perry dicta precludes
considering the government's reason for discontinuing a designated or

limited forum. 2 12

The court concluded that The Koala could proceed on a First
Amendment retaliation claim, having satisfied all of the elements of a
prima facie case: The magazine engaged in constitutionally protected
speech, the government responded by denying the magazine eligibility to
compete for student activity fees, the magazine suffered a detriment in
206. Id. at 1265.

207. Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 906 (9th Cir. 2019).
208. See id. at 898 ("[T]he First Amendment will not tolerate the administration of subsidy
programs with a censorious purpose."); see also id. at 899 ("[W]here a complaint alleges that the
state singled out the press by withholding a subsidy in response to disfavored speech, the
complaint alleges a viable Free Press Clause cause of action.").

209. See id. at 900 (citing Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489,
496 (9th Cir. 2015)) ("The principal difference between traditional and designated public forums
is that the government may close a designated public forum whenever it chooses, but it may not
close a traditional public forum to expressive activity altogether.").

210. Id. at 903.
211. Id. at 904-05
212. Id. at 905.
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being forced to discontinue printing, and the enactment of the Media Act
was causally connected to the content of the November 2015
magazine.213
The Koala case brings into clear focus why speakers excluded from a
purportedly closed forum must have constitutional recourse. Because the
metes-and-bounds of a forum are so malleable, government agencies
can-as UC-San Diego attempted to do-cloak the selective exclusion of
a class of speakers in the guise of a "closure."

IV.

KOALA, BEARABLE: RETALIATORY FORUM CLOSURE MERITS
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

Speakers who lack the money and prominence to reach a mass
audience through traditional publishing or advertising depend on access
to public property to convey their message. As courts have long noted,
political protests can be more attention-getting when held in proximity to
2 14
At the University
the place where disputed decisions are being made.
of Virginia, throngs of students, employees, and alumni packed the
Charlottesville campus in a 2012 rally to express outrage at the ouster of
215
President Teresa Sullivan, who was reinstated after weeks of outcry.
In Wisconsin, demonstrators opposed to Gov. Scott Walker's education
spending cuts flooded the grounds of the state Capitol in 2011 by the tens
2 16
In these and many other
of thousands, attracting national headlines.
instances, access to public property amplified the effectiveness of
political protest. At times, speech can only realistically occur on one
occasion in one location-consider, for instance, the case of a Mississippi
high-school student prevented from attending the senior prom, a once-in2 17
In such
a-lifetime event, because she intended to bring a female date.
instances, the loss of access to a forum can prevent a message from ever
being heard. The ability to use public property for expression facilitates
spontaneity, enabling speakers to react quickly to developing issues,

213. Id. at 906.
214. NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[P]rotests
frequently occur in response to topical events, and their effectiveness may depend both on their
immediacy and the forum where they take place."); see also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v.

City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The ability to communicate a
particular message in a particular location can significantly contribute to the effectiveness of that
communication.").
215. Andrew Rice, Anatomy of a Campus Coup, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 11, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/magazine/teresa-sullivan-uva-ouster.html.
216. Lila Shapiro, Wisconsin Protests: State Police Pursue Democratic Lawmakers
.

Boycotting Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2011, 2:54 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
2 46 9 7
wisconsin-protests-scott-walker-policen 8
217. McMillen v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (N.D. Miss. 2010).
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which is one reason the Supreme Court disfavors open-ended permitting
systems that allow the government to delay speech. 18
The value of access to government conduits for communication came
into sharp focus in August 2011 with a series of demonstrations inside
the stations of San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART")
system. When city authorities learned of the planned protests, they shut
down wireless internet services inside the transit stations in hopes of
making it more difficult for organizers to communicate. 2 19 Although the
shutdown was not litigated in court, it drew condemnation from First
Amendment scholars and commentators, reflecting the public's sense of
ownership in government-provided Wi-Fi service as a contemporary
archetype of the virtual public forum. 2 2 0
There is no legally binding obligation for the government to offer free
Wi-Fi service on public property. One might say that the government is
free to "close that forum" at will-if, for instance, the service becomes
too expensive to maintain, is too easily exploited by hackers, or is
unnecessary as smartphone owners increasingly rely on their own
wireless data plans rather than public networks. But when BART
authorities shut down Wi-Fi with the express purpose of interfering with
a political protest, the decision was widely regarded as impermissibly
motivated and unconstitutional. 22 1 If First Amendment law does not
provide for judicial scrutiny of government decisions intended to
suppress political dissent, one might ask what else the First Amendment
could be meant for.

218. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165-66 (2002) (characterizing a city ordinance requiring a permit to distribute pamphlets doorto-door as "offensive ... to the very notion of a free society").

219. Erika J. Pitzel, Bay Area Rapid Transit Actions of August 11, 2011: How Emerging
Digital Technologies Intersect with First Amendment Rights, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 783, 786

(2013).
220. See Brandon Wiebe, BART's Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting Free

Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless Censorship, 47 U.S.F. L. REv. 195, 215-16 (2012)
(arguing that, because it was motivated by intent to silence protests, BART's decision was a
content-based restriction in the designated public forum of wireless internet service and unlikely
to survive strict scrutiny if challenged).
221. See Justin Silverman, BART Phone Blackout: Did the S.F. TransitAgency Violate Free
Speech Protections?, SUFFOLK MEDIA L. (Aug. 27, 2011), https://suffolkmcis.wordpress.com/
2011/0 8 /2 7 /bart-phone-blackout-did-the-s-f-transit-agency-violate-free-speech-protections/
(contending that BART's interruption of wifi service was constitutionally infirm, whether
regarded as a content-motivated restraint in the public forum of a transit station or a public wifi
network, or whether it is analyzed as a prior restraint on speech).
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A. Why the Government's PurposeMatters
1. Courts Regularly Consider the Decision Maker's Motive in a
Constitutional Analysis
The notion that courts must refrain from second-guessing the motive
behind the decision to close a forum runs counter to decades' worth of
established First Amendment case law. Motive is relevant not only to the
outcome of countless First Amendment cases; it often is decisive.
Motive comes into play at several points of a First Amendment
analysis. The reasons offered by the government for a speech-restrictive
decision are properly scrutinized when a speaker alleges that the stated
justifications are pretextual, and that the real justification was to punish a
disfavored speaker or prevent that speaker from being heard. Facial
neutrality does not save a regulation on a limited forum from violating
the First Amendment when the policy is, in fact, designed to discriminate
based on viewpoint. 22 2 The Eighth Circuit summed it up succinctly, in a
case where landowners claimed that a government agency threatened to
condemn and acquire their farmland in retaliation for a lawsuit: "An act
taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is
actionable ... even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would
have been proper." 2 2 3 Even in Cornelius, a case involving a lesserprotected nonpublic forum, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
determine whether the government had engaged in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination in enacting restrictions on access to a federal
charity fundraising platform. 2 2 4 And outside the forum context, the
government's reason for restricting speech often is material; for instance,
the government may not restrict speech to spare the, ears of audience.
members who complain of being offended: "Indeed, if it is the speaker's
222. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985) (finding
that viewpoint-neutral regulations "that [are] in fact based on the desire to suppress a particular
point of viewf]" will not pass constitutional muster); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'

Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (pointing out that regulations that are "an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view[]" are not viewpointneutral); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
"[i]f the evidence reflects that [viewpoint] is the motivation or intent of the government in
enacting [a] regulation, the regulation is viewpoint discriminatory"), abrogatedby Amalgamated

Transit Union Local 1015 v. Spokane Transit Auth., 929 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2019); Eagle Point
Educ. Ass'n v. Jackson Sch. Dist. No. 9, No. 1:12-cv-00846-CL, 2015 WL 4170188, at *8 (D.
Or. 2015) (holding a school district policy disallowing protest on school property in the wake of
a teacher labor dispute violative of the First Amendment because, though the policy was facially
neutral, the record and timing indicated that the policy was established for viewpointdiscriminatory reasons).

223. Harrison v. Springdale Water Com'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150-51 (7th Cir.1984).
224. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 789.
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opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection." 22 5
Inquiry into motive is indispensable in First Amendment cases,
because ill-motivated government actors can readily dress up a targeted
act of punishment in the guise of a facially neutral enactment. Take the
case of Iowa's Tinker family-anti-war protesters who, at the height of
the Vietnam conflict, sought to express their support for a Christmastime
cease-fire by wearing black armbands to school in a silent act of symbolic
speech. 22 6 When the school district became aware of the planned protest,
school board members hastily enacted what appeared, on the surface, to
be a content-neutral regulation against all types of armbands, justifying
the prohibition as necessary to minimize distractions. 2 27 The ban could
have been upheld as incidentally burdening speech, since it applied
equally to all armbands, even those worn purely for ornamental purposes
conveying no particular message. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did
not hesitate to consider the cause-and-effect context that motivated the
school board to act, noting that other comparably distracting items of,
apparel were left unregulated. 22 8 Because the school's self-evident
motive was not to minimize distracting behavior but to chill the
expression of core political speech-opposition to the Vietnam War-the
prohibition was invalid. 22 9
Even when there is no overt suspicion of viewpoint-based retaliation
against particular speakers, the government's rationale is still weighed
and tested to determine whether a speech-restrictive policy is sufficiently
tailored to address the wrong that the government claims to be
targeting. 230 In Grace, a case involving attempts to restrict protest activity

on the sidewalk facing the U.S. Supreme Court building, the Court
scrutinized the government's proffered justifications-maintaining order
and decorum, and avoiding the appearance that the Court was influenced
by public pressure-and found the justifications inadequate to sustain a
ban on protest marches. 23 1 Even without evidence that particular speakers
were targeted for their viewpoints, the government's motive came into
play, weighing the relative strength of the justification against the amount
of speech sacrificed. 232 Because the sufficiency of the government's
justification is central to resolving many First Amendment cases, it is
fallacious to suggest that courts cannot or should not inquire into motive.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
Id at 508.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 514.
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983).
Id.
Id at 183.
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In nearly every area of law in which discrimination is at issue, the
courts have recognized that facial neutrality is not necessarily
dispositive. 23 3 The law of retaliation recognizes that even a relatively
benign act can become a constitutional violation when it is motivated by
an intent to chill constitutionally protected activity and would cause a
23 4
person of reasonable fortitude to refrain from further protected activity.
Assessing whether an act is unlawfully retaliatory regularly requires
scrutinizing the reason given for the act, to determine whether it is
genuine or pretextual.23 In holding that decision maker motive is
inconsequential in cases of forum closure, the district court in Koala
confused something that may be difficult to prove-illicit motivation23 6
Now-Justice Kagan
for something that would not matter if proven.
of motive in First
role
the
made the point adroitly in her article examining
Amendment cases: "[T]he impracticality of this inquiry need not force
courts to abandon the goal of invalidating improperly motivated
legislation .... If courts cannot determine motive directly, by exploring
what went into the legislative process, perhaps they can determine motive
237
obliquely, by looking at what came out of it."
Similarly, the decision maker's motivation can be conclusive where a
regulation is defended on the basis that its primary target is the nonexpressive elements of conduct and that its impact on speech is only

233. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534
(1993) (holding that in free exercise clause cases, "[f]acial neutrality is not determinative[]" and
"action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere
compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality."); Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of

Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that in employment discrimination
cases, "[a] willingness to inflict collateral damage by harming some, or even all, individuals from

a favored group in order to successfully harm members of a disfavored class does not cleanse the
taint of discrimination; it simply underscores the depth of the defendant's animus." (citing Griffin
v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964))); United States v. Goodwin,
219 F. App'x 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that in cases dealing with discriminatory use of
peremptory jury challenges, race-neutral bases for peremptory challenges may still be pretextual,
and thus discriminatory).

234. Ariz. Students' Ass'n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that all one needs to establish a claim of retaliation is: (1) engagement in constitutionally
protected activity; (2) official actions that would chill an ordinary person from continuing the
protected activity; and (3) that engagement in protected activity substantially motivated the

official action).
235. See, e.g., Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 2002) ("An act taken in
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable even if the action

would have been proper if taken for a different reason." (citing Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673,
681-82 (6th Cir. 1998))); Richardson v. Pratcher, 48 F. Supp. 3d 651, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(holding that, in First Amendment cases, "it is never objectively reasonable to act with retaliatory
intent[]").

236. See Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2019).
237. Kagan, supra note 1, at 440-41.
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incidental. As the Supreme Court said in Ward v. RockAgainst Racism:2 3 8
"The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases
generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys.. . . The government's purpose is the
controlling consideration." 2 3 9
The Supreme Court's recent resolution of a First Amendment
challenge to Colorado's prohibition on discrimination against gays and
lesbians, exemplifies how courts must inquire into the decision maker's
motive to determine whether animus to a religious group, or to religiosity
in general, was behind the enactment. 240 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the
Court's invalidation of a regulation prohibiting retail establishments from
denying service based on the customer's sexual orientation, turned
entirely on evidence of the decision maker's motivation. 2 4 1 Although the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission's regulation did not overtly reference
religion, the Court determined that hostility toward religion motivated the
Commission's decision, meaning it was not the product of a fair and,
neutral process. 2 42 The Court held that the "historical background" to a
government decision is relevant to determining whether an agency acted
with neutrality or bias toward religion, including "the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question" and
"contemporaneous statements made by members of the decision-making
body." 24 3 The Court relied on its 1993 resolution of a constitutional
challenge to a series of city ordinances restricting the ritual killing of
animals, which practitioners of the Santeria faith used in religious rites. 2 44
As in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court found the city's motivation there
to be a decisive factor: "[T]he laws in question were enacted by officials
who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that
their official actions violated the Nation's essential commitment to
religious freedom." 245
In striking down part of an Idaho statute restricting newsgathering in
and around agricultural operations, the Ninth Circuit considered the
legislature's motivation into determining whether the law could survive
strict scrutiny. 2 4 6 Proponents defended the law as an anti-trespassing
measure to protect the security of property that only incidentally
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
520, 540
244.
245.
246.

491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 791.
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
Id. at 1728-30.
Id. at 1729-30.
Id. at 1731 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
(1993)).
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535-36.
Id. at 524.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1198 (9th Cir. 2018).
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2 47 Observing
burdened speech, but the appeals court was unconvinced.
that the statute's legislative history indicated intent to suppress
information-gathering by journalists and animal-rights activists, the court

held:
The record reflects that the statute was partly motivated to
protect members of the agricultural industry from
persecution in the court of public opinion, and journalists
who use exposes to publicly crucify a company. ... [W]e
do not ignore that a vocal number of supporters were less
concerned with the protection of property than they were
24
about protecting a target group from critical speech[.] 1
Beyond the First Amendment, courts regularly consider motive in
assessing whether a statute is constitutional. In Equal Protection Clause
analysis, for example, , courts often must inquire into the motives of
policymakers, and even facially neutral enactments will be invalidated if
249
The
their purpose was to impose a disadvantage on a protected class.
Dormant Commerce Clause has been invoked to invalidate state statutes
enacted with the purpose of imposing competitive disadvantages on outof-state business entities. 2 1 Similarly, cases under the Establishment
Clause or the Bill of Attainder Clause, may require courts to inquire into
25 1 One
the subjective intentions of legislators for possible illicit motives.
of the primary purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to strike down
discriminatorily motivated state legislation directed against racial
minorities. 252 In adjudicating a challenge to Ohio's election laws, for
example, the Supreme Court stated, "In determining whether or not a
state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts
and circumstances behind the law .... "2

247. Id. at 1192.
248. Id. at 1198.
249. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (reasoning voting district violates
Constitution if race was "the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a
significant number of voters within or without" the district); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93

(1986) (explaining prosecutor's peremptory challenges are unconstitutional if based solely on
purposeful racial discrimination); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976)
(explaining that facially neutral statutes that have a disparate impact on protected minorities are
unconstitutional if there is proof of a legislative purpose to discriminate).

250. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1978).
251. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (reasoning legislature's
"actual purpose" to promote religion invalidates statute); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,

313-14 (1946) (reasoning circumstances of bill's passage showed that its purpose was to punish
particular individuals).
252. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
253. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
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2. Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Foreclose Considering Motive
The notion that courts may not scrutinize the motives of government
decisionmakers is rooted in caselaw that has either been discredited by
time, overruled, or misunderstood.
The Supreme Court's infamous civil-rights-era decision in Palmer v.
Thompson, finding no Equal Protection Clause violation when the city of
Jackson, Mississippi, closed a public swimming pool rather than admit
black patrons, is sometimes cited for the proposition that courts should
review constitutional challenges to legislative acts without regard for
what motivated the legislators. 25 4 In Palmer, Justice Hugo Black wrote
for a 5-4 majority that evidence of racial animus on the part of Jackson
city council members was irrelevant, because the ordinance had the effect
of treating all would-be patrons of the pool equally: "[N]o case in this
Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely
because of the motivations of the men who voted for it." 255 In a nod to
practicality, Black noted the likely "futility" of invalidating an ordinance
that "would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant
governing body repassed it for different reasons." 256 In a vigorous dissent,
Justice Byron White enumerated a long list of instances in which the
Court has looked beyond the facial neutrality of a challenged decision
and invalidated the decision because of its invidious purpose, such as a
refusal to sell real estate-a lawful act except where the refusal is
motivated by the prospective buyer's race. 257 "Official conduct is no
more immune to characterization based on its motivation than is private
conduct," wrote White, "and we have so held many times." 25 8 In a
separate dissent, Justice William O. Douglas added, "I conclude that
though a State may discontinue any of its municipal services-such as
schools, parks, pools, athletic fields, and the like-it may not do so for
the purpose of perpetuating or installing apartheidor because it finds life
in a multi-racial community difficult or unpleasant." 25 9
Whether Palmer remains good law at all is doubtful. As one district
court observed, in a case alleging that a county's system of appointing
voter registrars discriminated against Spanish-speaking candidates, "[t]he
Supreme Court has never expressly overturned Palmer, but it has all but
done so. Time and again over the past two decades, the Court has held
that facially neutral laws may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

403 U.S. 217 (1971).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 241 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 242 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 239 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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260 The
they are enacted or enforced with a discriminatory intent."
Supreme Court itself said, just five years after deciding Palmer: "To the
extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that
legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior
cases ... are to the contrary," 26 1 raising the question of how much of
Palmeris left standing at all.
Moreover, as an equal protection case, the Palmer case does not
translate to the First Amendment context, because the plaintiff's burdens
are fundamentally different. An equal protection claim requires proof that
the plaintiff received less-advantageous treatment than a similarly
situated person in a different demographic category, and that there is no
2 2 A prima facie First
rational basis for the disparate treatment.
Amendment case does not require identifying a comparator who received
preferential treatment; it is enough for plaintiffs to show that they
suffered a deprivation at the hands of a state actor causally connected to
protected speech. 263
The Palmer majority relied on an aggressive reading of the Court's
landmark 1968 decision in O'Brien, upholding the conviction of a
Vietnam War protester who burned his draft card in violation of a federal
prohibition.264 In O'Brien, the Court found that the statute making
destruction of a draft card a federal offense did not violate the First
Amendment. 2 6' The Court found that the statute could be justified by the
government's interest in assuring the integrity of draft cards, despite its
"incidental" impact on expression. 2 6 6 To reach that result, the Court
coined what has become known as the O'Brien test for a regulation that
regulates mixed speech and nonspeech conduct:

260. See Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 970 (N.D. I1. 1989) (citing Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.1 1 (1976), for the proposition that "[t]o the extent that Palmer
suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative purposes is irrelevant in constitutional
adjudication, our prior cases ... are to the contrary.").

261. Washington, 426 U.S. at 244 n.11.
262. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006).
263. See Smith v. Cty. of Suffolk, 776 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that, to
survive summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must show

that "[1] he has engaged in protected First Amendment activity, [2] he suffered an adverse
employment action, and [3] there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action." (citing Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2007))).
264. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (citing O'Brien and concluding
that laws should not be voided based on the perceived motives of their drafters, because "it is
extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations,
that lie behind a legislative enactment").

265. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-72 (1968).
266. Id. at 376, 382.
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[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial government interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. 2 67
The Court declined to inquire into the defendant's contention that the
statute was invalid because Congress passed it specifically to suppress
expressions of political dissent, declaring: "[U]nder settled principles the
purpose of Congress ... is not a basis for declaring this legislation
unconstitutional. It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis
of an alleged illicit legislative motive." 2 68 The Court cited primarily
practical considerations for reaching this conclusion: First, that it is too
difficult to discern from a handful of legislators' comments what might
have motivated the rest of them, and second, that invalidating an illmotivated statute is futile, because legislators will simply reenact the law
with a better sounding justification. 269 It is from this pronouncement that
subsequent courts have made the jump to conclude that the motive for
discontinuing a designated forum is of no legal relevance.
Given its broad wording, O'Brienunderstandably has been interpreted
as foreclosing inquiry into congressional motive for a challenged
legislative enactment. 2 70 But the operative-and limiting-phrase is "a
statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face ... " 2 7 1
Properly understood, O'Brien stands merely for the unremarkable
principle that judges do not strike down statutes for being unwise. That
is, in the absence of a legislative objective that is itself illegal, courts do
not question whether legislators pursued that objective for bad reasons.
O'Brien is factually distinguishable from more typical First Amendment
forum-speech cases for the simple reason that the restriction or closure of
a forum will always be about expression, but the regulation in O'Brien
said nothing about expression at all; it was just as illegal to throw away a
draft card to make space in an overstuffed wallet as it was to burn the
card during a demonstration. 272

267. Id. at 377.

268. Id. at 383.
269. Id. at 384.
270. Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1292-93 (7th Cir.
1996).
271. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384.

272. Id at 377.
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Subsequent Supreme Court rulings have cabined the O'Brien doctrine
considerably. 2 73 Either explicitly or implicitly, courts do consider the
purpose behind even facially neutral enactments, including in the First
2 74
Amendment context. For instance, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, the
Court invalidated an ordinance criminalizing displays of symbols that
aroused anger or resentment based on race, gender or other protected
characteristics, an attempt to outlaw cross-burning and similar displays
of racial hate speech. 275 The majority's opinion repeatedly comes back to
the question of motive, insisting that the First Amendment forbids the
government from proscribing speech because of hostility to its
message. 27 6
In a thoughtful and well-reasoned examination of the forum doctrine,
a federal district court explained, in the case of a city's attempt to block
the Ku Klux Klan from taking advantage of an open-access cable TV
channel, there is a decisive difference between the decisionmaker's
2 77 While O'Brien may
"motive" and the decisionmaker's "purpose."
foreclose inquiry into motive, the court explained, it leaves untouched the
Court's long tradition of considering legislative purpose. 2 7 8 To illustrate,
using the facts of the Missouri Knights KKK case, the city's "purpose"
in voting to allow the local cable TV franchisor to pull the plug on its
279
public-access station was to keep the Klan from airing its message. The
city council's "motive" for that decision could have been any number of
things: It could have been fear of a violent reaction by those incited by
(or provoked into opposition to) the Klan's message; it could have been
a politically motivated attempt to cater to black voters; it could have been
personal animosity toward the local Klan leader, and .so on. If this
understanding is correct, then there is no inconsistency between, on one
hand, the O'Brien admonition against peering into the hard-to-read
thoughts of the decisionmakers, and on the other hand, the long line of
other cases in which the reason for enacting a policy either validated or
vitiated it.
If the Koala case is viewed by way of the analytical distinction
recognized by the court in the Missouri Knights KKK case; the
273. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 427-28 ("Despite the proscription in O'Brien, the Court
sometimes has probed the government's reasons for restricting expression; too, the Court has
articulated several statements of First Amendment principle that sound in terms of motivation.").

274. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
275. Id. at 391.
276. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 421-22 (positing that R.A.V. is a case about the
government's viewpoint-suppressive motive, and citing several passages in which the Court
alludes to motive).

277. Mo. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (W.D. Mo.
1989).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1439-50.
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government's "purpose" in closing the forum was, indisputably, is to find
a way to cut off financial support for The Koala without singling out one
publication for a selective exclusion that would be reviewed for
viewpoint bias. That purpose is itself invidious under the First
Amendment. The government's "motive" for wanting to deprive The
Koala of financial support might be to respond to offended critics in the
community, or to improve the university's image for recruitment
purposes, but-following O'Brien's caution as it is properly
understood-that "motive" does not matter. What matters is that there
was a constitutionally infirm purpose, as that term was understood in
Missouri Knights-an objective to deny a speaker a platform, based on
an offensive viewpoint.
The oft-replicated passage in Perry Education, widely interpreted as
giving government agencies license to close a forum for any reason,
might be best understood by analogy to the law of at-will employment. 28 0
While it is widely understood that an employer may terminate an at-will
employee for any reason or even for no reason at all, "no reason" stilL
does not mean an impermissible retaliatory reason. 2 8 1 At-will employees
are regularly permitted to bring First Amendment claims, even for the
loss of jobs in which they had no legally cognizable expectation of
continued employment.
In a recent gloss on anti-retaliation law, the Supreme Court held that
a government employer can be liable for unlawful retaliation even where
there is no act of legally protected expression at all, if the victim was
punished for what the decision maker mistakenly believed was said. 2 82 In
that case-brought by a demoted police officer, whose non-expressive
act of ferrying a campaign yard sign to a relative's home was mistaken
for a statement of support for the candidate-the Court found that motive
was, in fact, everything: "[T]he government's reason for demoting [the
officer] is what counts here. When an employer demotes an employee out
280. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
281. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661
(1994), a case involving a public hospital's decision to fire an employee for speech deemed to be
disruptive to the workplace. While the Court found that the employee presented no valid First
Amendment claim because her speech was unprotected, the Court went on to state that, under
different circumstances, a public employee would have "the right not to be dismissed (even from
an at-will government job) in retaliation for her expression of views on a matter of public

concern." Id. at 692. See also Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W. 3d 96, 108-09 (Tenn. 2015)
(explaining "[u]nder that doctrine, employment for an indefinite period of time may be terminated
by either the employer or the employee at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all ... This
traditional rule, however, is not absolute; some restrictions have been imposed on the right of the
employer to discharge an employee. Tennessee has recognized a common-law claim for
retaliatory discharge where an employee is discharged in contravention of public policy.")
(citations omitted).

282. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016).
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of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity
that the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge
that unlawful action under the First Amendment ... .)"283 What mattered
was that the government acted with a wrongfully speech-punitive
motivation, chilling other would-be speakers from expressing
constitutionally protected political views.284
Now that the Supreme Court has said in Heffernan that a decision not
punishing any actual speech (as the officer was not in fact speaking) is
actionable because it was wrongfully motivated by an intent to punish
speech, it would be topsy-turvy to suggest that a decision motivated to
punish speech by way of closing a forum is non-actionable because it
restricts too much speech. If Heffernan teaches anything, it is that the First
Amendment provides recourse against being targeted for speechmotivated punishment, even if the aim is imprecise.
B. Why Motive Must Matter
1. Access to Government Property for Expression is Essential for
People with Marginalized or Contrarian Viewpoints
First Amendment doctrine has long recognized that inexpensive, doit-yourself modes of expression must be zealously protected, precisely
because they are accessible to less powerful speakers with nonmajoritarian views. 28 5 This is particularly so with government property.
As Professor David Cole has persuasively argued, government has a
constitutional obligation to protect the independence even of speakers
whose message depends on publicly funded conduits to reach its
audience: "[T]he mere fact that the government is paying for the
expression should not free it from the neutrality dictates of the [F]irst
[A]mendment." 2 86

283. Id. at 1418.
284. See id. at 1419 ("The discharge of one tells the others that they engage in protected
activity at their peril.").

285. See Horina v. City of Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that
"handbilling is both a method of communication that has a long and venerable history that
predates the birth of this nation" and citing the Supreme Court's observation in Lovell v. City of

Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) that handbills have served as "historic weapons in the defense
of liberty[l"). See also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (disapproving a city's
prohibition on signs in the yards and windows of homes: "Residential signs are an unusually cheap
and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited
mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute.").
286. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: ChartingSpheres of Neutrality in

Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 737 (1992).
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Where there is a selective exclusion from a forum, courts inquire
whether the speaker has reasonable alternative channels to be heard. 2 87
The same concern-that government should not unduly deny access to
speakers who lack adequate outlets to reach the public-applies with
equal, if not greater, force to the closure of a forum. As the Supreme Court
said in Rosenberger, responding to the university's contention that the
refusal to subsidize religious publications applied to more than just the
plaintiff's newspaper: "[E]xclusion of several views on [a] problem is
just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one." 2 88 To
the excluded speaker, it makes no practical difference whether the forum
has been narrowed, or entirely closed. And it makes no practical sense,
in the latter instance, to forego inquiring whether reasonable alternative
means of expression exist.
If it becomes established First Amendment doctrine that a government
agency may discontinue operating a forum even for a viewpoint
retaliatory reason, there would be no constitutional impediment to the
agency serving notice on speakers. Potentially, if speech crosses the line
of what government deems acceptable, the plug will be pulled and no
further speech will be allowed. The chilling effect of making forum
property so fragile-and letting speakers know that the ice on which they
are skating may give way at any time-is self-evident.
2. College Media has Unique Civic and Educational Value, and is
Uniquely Vulnerable to Government Suppression and Reprisal by Way
of Manipulating Forum Property
It is unsurprising that the "virtual forum" doctrine was first recognized
in the context of a public university, because the Supreme Court has
regularly been called on to referee free speech clashes on college
campuses. Public universities are recognized as places where the
unfettered exchange of viewpoints-no matter how extreme or unpopularis not just tolerable, but central to the institutions' purpose and
function. 2 89 Courts have delivered a virtually unbroken string of rulings

287. See Wright, supra note 40, at 425 (explaining that, when content-neutral restrictions on
speech in a public forum are challenged, "courts often inquire into whether there remain adequate
alternative channels for speakers to convey their messages"). See also Satawa v. Macomb Cty.

Rd. Comm'n, 689 F.3d 506, 524 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying strict scrutiny in a case alleging that a
Michigan county selectively excluded a religious speaker from a highway media park that was

accessible to foot traffic by others).
288. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
289. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
("The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'). See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
836 ("For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students
risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's
intellectual life, its college and university campuses.").
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affirming the critical importance of First Amendment protections for
college students. 2 90
It is equally unsurprising that the Rosenberger "virtual forum" case
involves institutional meddling into the editorial content of studentproduced publications. Freedom of the press controversies are a regular
29 1
and the entire community has a
occurrence on college campuses,
vested interest in making sure college journalists can freely share
information about their institutions, even when it is unflattering. College
journalists are increasingly the only journalists regularly informing the
public about the activities of higher-education institutions, as
29 2
professional news outlets fall victim to economic distress.
Student news organizations perform an invaluable oversight function
holding their campuses accountable to the public. At Kent State
University, investigative reporting by student journalists brought to light
the checkered business career of a major donor who had been disciplined
for violating federal securities laws resulting from his participation in a
Ponzi scheme, a revelation that led the university to backpedal on plans

290. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (invalidating
university speech policies, including harassment policy); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301,
320 (3d Cir. 2008) (striking down overbroad anti-harassment policy); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich.
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995) (declaring university discriminatory harassment policy
facially unconstitutional); Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (declaring university policy regulating "potentially disruptive" events
unconstitutional).

291. See, e.g., OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
university officials could be held liable for discriminatorily confiscating only the newsracks
belonging to an upstart alternative campus newspaper and not other publications); Husain v.

Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that college president violated student editors'
First Amendment

rights by

postponing campus election

endorsement); Hays Cty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d

in response

to their editorial

111, 121 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that

university's regulations unduly restrained students from distributing publications containing
advertising except under narrowly limited circumstances); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 26061 (5th Cir. 1975) (ruling that public university cannot replace newspaper editors absent conduct
substantially disruptive to institutional operations, and mere disagreement with editorial content

decisions does not rise to that level of justification); Bazaar v. Fortune, 489 F.2d 225, 227 (5th
Cir. 1973) (finding that "earthy" language in student-authored short stories was not a sufficient
justification for a university to refuse to distribute a student-produced magazine); Joyner v.

Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 1973) (concluding that historically black college could not
withdraw financial support from student newspaper as punishment for harshly worded articles
'challenging the admission of increasing numbers of non-black students).
292. See, e.g., William Anderson, Student Journalists Are Our Future-We Should Start
Treating Them Like It, THE NATION (July 11, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/studentjournalists-are-our-future-we-shouldstart-treating-them-like-it/ ("[S]tudent journalists are
uniquely positioned to fill the hole created by the decline of local news."); Jennifer Conlin, Local
TIMES

(Apr. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/0

business/media/turning-to-collegejournalists-for-the-news-in-town-michigan.html

how college newspapers have filled the void of shuttered local news agencies).

4
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4
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News, Off College Presses, N.Y.

(detailing

2019]

EVERYBODY OUT OF THE POOL

45

to name an athletic facility after the donor. 2 9 3 At Texas A&M University,
student journalists with The Battalion used public records to expose the
extent of university foundation investments in companies associated with
the Sudanese genocide, a matter of undeniable public interest and
concern. 2 9 4 Without financially viable student journalistic publications,
stories of this kind will not come to light.
Left without oversight, the administrators of colleges and universities
will, at times, overreach their rightful authority and punish speakers
merely because they provoke controversy or challenge campus
policies. 295 As far back as 1934, Louisiana State University expelled
seven college journalists who published a letter-to-the-editor harshly
critical of the state's legendarily powerful U.S. senator, Huey P. Long. 2 9 6
Generations later, administrators at Wichita State University threatened
their student newspaper with a crippling reduction in financial support
following a string of hard-hitting investigative reports exposing
administrative malfeasance, including a scheme to disguise stagnating
enrollment by padding the 'rolls with "students" taking free, one -half -,
credit online courses. 2 97

In a 2016 report, a coalition of academic-freedom organizations led
by the American Association of University Professors documented an
escalating pattern of harassment and hostility toward journalists on
college campuses by image-sensitive administrators. 2 98 The report
detailed how student news organizations have experienced both direct
censorship and indirect censorship pressure by .way of threats to their
faculty advisors' jobs, the retaliatory freeze-out of access, and withdrawal
of financial support. 29 9 Recently, the former student editor of Liberty
293. Dan Reimold, Investigative Reporting on Campus, C. MEDIA REV. (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://cmreview.org/investigative-reporting-on-campus.
294. Spencer Davis, A Dark Spot on Texas A&M's Investments, THE BATTALION (Nov. 10,
2015), http://www.thebatt.com/news/a-dark-spot-on-texas-a-m-sinvestments/article_33a57b34-

8777-11e5-b098-43d234042495.html.
295. See Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 707 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding Iowa State University
violated university
discrimination).

newspaper's

First

Amendment

rights

by

engaging

in

viewpoint

296. Nicole Comparto, Note, Combating Institutional Censorship of College Journalists:
The Needfor a 'TailoredPublic Forum ' Categoryto Best Protect SubsidizedStudent Newspapers,
71 U. MIAmi L. REV. 528, 530 (2017). See also Andrea Gallo, Reveille Rebels: Reveille Seven's
clash with Huey P. Long leaves lasting legacy, THE DAILY REVEILLE (Oct. 23, 2013),
https://www.lsureveille.com/news/revei lle-rebels-reveille-seven-s-clash-with-huey-p-long/

article_b7ffl0aa-3c3a- l e3-b424-001 a4bcf6878.html.
297. Suzanne Perez Tobias, Proposed cut to Wichita State student newspaper- is it payback

for critical coverage?, THE WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.kansas.com/news/
local/education/article202497094.html.
298. American Association of University Professors et al., Threats to the Independence of
Student Media 4, 6, 7 (Dec. 2016), https://www.aaup.org/file/StudentMediaReport_0.pdf.

299. Id. at 1, 4, 6, 7.
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University's student newspaper recounted being forced to apologize for
truthfully reporting on campus crime, and to submit his stories to be
sanitized by administrators, who now completely control all editorial
decisions. 30 0
A 2015 report in The Atlantic described "a string of studentnewspaper controversies that have erupted in the past year," highlighted
by the sudden firing of the faculty journalism advisor at Butler
University, after she was accused of tipping off the newspaper to an
impending announcement of campus-wide budget cuts. 3 0 1 Many of these
controversies involved students facing official retaliation for publicservice journalism. The Atlantic featured the case of the student
newspaper at the University of Memphis, which faced funding cuts after
it published an opinion piece criticizing the university for its lack of
response in the wake of a rape on campus. 3 02 As these cases exemplify,
student journalistic publications will be vulnerable to content-based
pressure from administrators if colleges are permitted-in the guise of
"forum closure"-to rescind life-sustaining financial support.
A recent survey of student editors of flagship newspapers at public,
four-year colleges revealed that more than 60% of these publications
faced at least one instance of administrative censorship during a one year
period.30 3 More than one fifth of student editors of newspapers that
receive at least some college or departmental funding reported
3
experiencing threats of funding cuts during a one year period. 0
College news organizations also are not immune to the realities of
declining advertising and circulation that have buffeted the professional
news media, and in recent years, many have been forced to reduce or
eliminate printing, move into less expensive quarters, and take other
drastic austerity measures. 30 5 Unlike their professional counterparts,

300. Will E. Young, Inside Liberty University's 'culture offear,' WASH. POST, July 24, 2019;
See also Diane McFarlin & Frank LoMonte, We Must Save Independent Student Newsrooms,
9
/11/collegesINSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2019/0
journalists
("Student
should-support-independent-perspective-student-newspapers-offer-opinion
regularly report being frozen out from access to information, threatened with retaliation for candid
reporting that exposes institutional shortcomings or demonized by the very people responsible for
educating them.").
301. David R. Wheeler, The Plot Against Student Newspapers?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept.
30, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/the-plot-against-studentnews

papers/408106/.
302. Id.
303. Lindsie D. Trego, Mapping the Landscape of College Press Censorship: A Quantitative
Analysis of Administrative Pressures on College Newspapers 53 (Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina), https://doi.org/10.17615/e6bl-wj92.
304. Id. at 57.
305. See Jennifer Preston, Black and White and in the Red, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11 /03/education/edlife/student-newspapers-scurry-to-make-ends
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which do not accept government funding, student journalistic
publications are uniquely vulnerable to retaliation from the people they
cover, because few can afford to operate on earned advertising revenue
alone. Only 15.4% of newspapers with online editions are able to fully
support the operating costs of their online editions with online advertising
revenue. 306 Surveys show that most news publications receive student
activity fees (53.5%) and/or general college funds (31.6%).307 At most
student news publications, institutional funding accounts for more than
half the annual operating budget. 308 This dependency leaves many student
publications especially vulnerable to official censorship. For example,
The University Daily Kansan at the University of Kansas faced a $45,000
annual budget reduction after it printed an editorial criticizing the student
senate's election process. 309 Funding was restored in a negotiated
resolution, but only after newspaper editors were forced to file a First
Amendment suit against the university president.3 1 0
Because students at public colleges and universities rely on access to
campus property to engage in speech of social and political value, it is
important to enforce meaningful First Amendment curbs on the
retaliatory withdrawal of access. If campus property, whether physical or
fmancial, may be freely closed to speech at the whim of state authorities
without judicial oversight, the public's access to candid information
about the operations of powerful educational institutions will be at risk.
3. Refusing to Consider Motive Reduces Absurd and SelfDefeating Results
If the government comes within one inch of closing a forum, that
decision receives rigorous scrutiny. For instance, if the government
enacted conditions on the use of forum property that excluded all but one
potential speaker, that policy of selective exclusion would be reviewed
under strict scrutiny, and would almost certainly flunk. If the government
closed a piece of property to expression except for a 15-minute window
-meet.html (describing how once-thriving college publications have tapped into reserve funds,
launched donation campaigns, and taken other desperation measures to meet operating expenses).

306. Lillian Lodge Kopenhaver, Research Spotlight: Still in Growth Mode, C. MEDIA REV.
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://cmreview.org/research-spotlight-still-in-growth-mode/.

307. Id.
308. See id. (finding that 38.6% of college newspapers receive at least half their annual
budgets from student activities fees, while 21.2% receive at least half their annual budgets from

general college funds).
309. Madeline Will, Editors of the Daily Kansan filed First Amendment suit against
university administratorsfor funding reduction, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.splc.org/article/2016/02/daily-kansan-lawsuit.
310. Evelyn Andrews, Lawsuit over student ewspaper funding at University of Kansas
voluntarily dismissed, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (July 7, 2016), http://www.splc.org/article/2016/
07 /lawsuit-over-student-newspaper-funding-at-kansas-university-voluntarily-dismissed.
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at 2 a.m. every alternate Wednesday, that near-closure would have to be
proven reasonable and content-neutral; such an extreme measure would
almost surely fail the test of reasonableness."31 But take away that 15
minutes of availability, and-in the view of some courts-the decision
becomes unreviewable. 3 12
In his partial concurrence in a 1996 case involving federal attempts to
regulate the content of cable television programming, Justice Anthony
Kennedy recognized the danger of allowing a government agency to
evade rigorous scrutiny of selectively excluding speakers from a limited
public forum by labeling the decision as a change in the forum's limits:
"If Government has a freer hand to draw content-based distinctions in
limiting a forum than in excluding someone from it, the First Amendment
would be a dead letter in designated public fora; every exclusion could
be recast as a limitation." 3 13 Even the Grossbaum case, widely cited as a
license to disregard the government's retaliatory motive, admits of some
exceptions: "[G]overnment officials cannot escape a retaliation claim by
simply dressing up individualized government action to look like a
general rule." 3 14
If the judiciary abdicates all oversight over the forum designation (or
non-designation) of public property, then forum status could be
opportunistically switched on and off at will. Suppose that, upon
receiving an application from the Sons of Confederate Veterans to use
municipal light poles for a Confederate Memorial Day observance, the
City of Lexington responded by discontinuing the light pole programclosing the forum-and then, the day after Confederate Memorial Day,
resumed the program. Nakedly viewpoint-motivated exclusions cannot
be insulated from judicial review by affixing the cosmetic label of "forum
closure." 31 5 Indeed, if agencies may freely close a forum at any time for
any reason, there would be nothing to stop an ill-motivated actor from
thwarting a court order to admit a wrongfully excluded speaker by
declaring that the forum no longer exists, thus undermining the
judiciary's ability to meaningfully oversee viewpoint discrimination on
3 16
public property.
311.
312.
232 (4th
313.

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 829 (1995).
See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224,
Cir. 2013).
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 801 (1996)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

314. Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1295 (1996).
315. See Stephen R. Elzinga, Retaliatory Forum Closure, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 533 (2012)
("Without a remedy for retaliatory forum closure, the government can open a forum and keep it

open as long as no disfavored speakers make use of the forum. Then, when a disfavored speaker
begins to use the forum, the government can close the forum.").

316. This is the scenario anticipated by the Supreme Court in an equal-protection case
involving disputed public property. See generally Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1970)
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It makes little practical sense to erect a categorical wall between cases
of "selective exclusion of speakers from a forum" versus "total closure of
a forum," because it will not always be clear which of the two has
happened. Take the case of immigrant-rights protesters who were
excluded from demonstrating on an Arizona roadside adjacent to a U.S.
Border Patrol checkpoint. 31 7 The government contended that the
character of the property had changed so drastically that it transformed
into a nonpublic forum. 3 18 But the demonstrators argued that other
people-including, on at least one occasion, a counter-demonstratorhad been allowed to use the area. 319 In other words, rather than a forum
closure, they argued that the facts showed a targeted exclusion of
disfavored speakers, which indisputably is reviewable under the First
Amendment.32 0 Because a forum is rarely made irrevocably inaccessible
for speech-the Border Patrol could open the roadside or close it on a
moment's notice, depending on who wanted to use it-the concept of
"closure" is a malleable and transitory one. The roadside may in fact have
been "closed"-until someone who supported the Border Patrol showed
up wanting to demonstrate there. It will not always be clear whether a
forum has ceased to exist or has simply been made inaccessible to people
with a particular viewpoint.3 2 1 While in the Border Patrol case there was
some evidence of counter-demonstration activity, that will not always be
true on forum property, as people who advocate for change in policies are
much more likely to engage in protest activity than people who support
the status quo. For instance, labor unions are much more likely to picket
outside a factory than are the factory's managers, so a city ordinance
declaring sidewalks to be off-limits for picketing (facially, a forum
closure) is far more likely to affect labor than management (functionally,
a selective viewpoint-based exclusion from a forum).
In other First Amendment contexts, the fact that a retaliatory
government act affects more than just the speaker who alleges retaliation

(finding no constitutional violation in a municipality's decision to dissolve a city park in
compliance with the racially discriminatory preferences of a testator, whose will rescinded his gift
of land for a city park if the city was compelled to open the park to black visitors, and
distinguishing the case from the hypothetical scenario of a city that "closes that park of its own
accord solely to avoid the effect of a prior court order directing that the park be integrated," which
would more clearly present a Fourteenth Amendment issue).

317.
318.
319.
320.

Jacobson v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 882 F.3d 878, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 881.
Id

321. See Elzinga, supra note 315, at 500-01 (collecting cases in which a particular speaker
has motivated an agency to close access to a forum, and observing: "Although such forum closures
ostensibly affect all speakers equally, the mask of neutrality merely conceals underlying

viewpoint discrimination.").
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does not deprive the speaker of a claim. 322 Take, for example, a
participant in a protest rally ("Doe"), who directs insulting language at a
police officer alleging that police use force wantonly against minoritiesspeech that the Constitution indisputably protects. If the angered officer
responds by throwing Doe and 20 of her listeners into the police van and
citing them for disorderly conduct, Doe is not denied First Amendment
redress just because non-speakers suffered the same harm, so long as she
can prove causation.
The prudential concern recognized in O'Brien and cases following
it-that motive is simply too difficult to discern-may apply in a subset
32 3
A decision might be
of forum-closure cases, but not in every case.
made by 300 members of a legislature whose motive is indecipherableor it might be made by a single executive whose motive is readily detected
(take, for example, the decision by a county sheriff to deactivate the
agency's Facebook page after his critics begin using the page to criticize
his job performance). Indeed, the cause-and-effect between an unwanted
speaker and the closure of a forum is at times undisputed, as in the Gay
32 5
Even where it is
Guardiancase3 2 4 (or, more recently, the Koala case).
not conceded, the government's intent to target a single speaker with a
disagreeable viewpoint may manifest from the circumstances of the
forum and its use. For instance, in the Ninth Circuit's Jacobson case, the
only people using the roadside for expression were people opposed to the
Border Patrol, so the purportedly neutral closure of the protest venue was
326 The fact
plainly motivated to foreclose future anti-government speech.
that motive sometimes cannot be ascertained is a problem of proof, the
burden of which can be assigned to the First Amendment plaintiff, and
not a reason to categorically forego making the inquiry.
Finally, it makes no sense to declare that the decision to close a
designated public forum is unreviewable, because that puts designated
forum property on footing inferior to that of nonpublic forum property.
Even in a nonpublic forum, any government decision-including the
decision whether to close the property to expression-is reviewable for
reasonableness. 32 7 If there is no First Amendment redress for the decision
322. See, e.g., Vodak v. City of Chicago, No, 03 C 2463, 2006 WL 1037151 (Apr. 17, 2006)
(allowing antiwar demonstrators who were arrested by Chicago police to proceed with a First
Amendment class-action claim even though some of those arrested were not speaking or engaging
in expressive conduct but were mere spectators).

323. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
324. See Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg'l Library Sys., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1379 (S.D. Ga. 2002).
325. See Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2019).
326. Jacobson v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 882 F.3d 878, 880-82, 884 (9th Cir. 2018).
327. See, e.g., Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying reasonableness
standard to U.S. Postal Service's decision to discontinue providing the homeless with free generaldelivery mailboxes, which the court's majority treated as a nonpublic forum case).
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to eliminate a designated public forum, then a speaker's rights arguably
are better protected on non-forum property, upending decades of
established constitutional precedent.
Dating back to the civil rights era, government agencies have
conveyed away ownership of public property specifically to deprive the
property of its "governmental" character with the intent to pretermit
constitutional claims. 3 2 8 As Professor Zick describes in his detailed
examination of the history of "circumvention-by-disposition," courts
have regularly been called upon to intercede when government agencies
seek to achieve indirectly, through disposition of property, what would
be illegal if done on government property, such as operating racially
segregated schools. 3 2 9 He concludes, harking back to the Supreme
Court's now-discredited case about the City of Jackson's swimming
pools:
As Palmer starkly demonstrated, holding that the mere
fact of disposition immediately extinguishes
any
constitutional concerns would grant governments the
authority to turn the Constitution on or off at will. ... While
governments may not have any constitutional obligation to
provide schools, streets, and parks in the first place, once
they do so, they must manage and dispose of such properties
in a manner that complies with constitutional obligations and
respects constitutional guarantees. Although the point has
sometimes been obscured or misunderstood by courts and
public officials, the dispositions themselves are state actions
subject to constitutional limitations. 33 0
By the same logic, where property is merely recharacterized rather
than sold or donated, courts likewise should not abdicate their authority
to look behind even the most transparent evasion tactics by declaring the
closure of a forum categorically off-limits to review.
C. Getting the Koala Down From the Tree: A Way Forward
If the judiciary's primary concern is that discerning the motive for
closing a public forum is too difficult, comfortable and well-tested
analytical frameworks already exist to dispose of cases in which proof of
motive is elusive. The burden could be assigned to the excluded speaker
to establish a prima facie case of invidious motive, through something
more than inchoate suspicion and conclusory allegations. If the speaker
328. Zick, supra note 97, at 1362-63.
329. Zick, supra note 97, at 1365, 1375-76. For example, he cites the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Wright v. Baker Cy. Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1974), in which a sham transfer of a
school building to enable private proprietors to thwart court-ordered integration by operating an
all-white academy was overturned.
330. Zick, supra note 97, at 1416.
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cannot come forward with such evidence, then the case can be summarily
dismissed.
The Supreme Court has already recognized a burden-shifting analysis
in the analogous context of retaliatory employment actions where the
employee's speech is at issue.33 In Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle,3 3 2 the Court drew a roadmap for courts to follow in
adjudicating "mixed-motive" claims where speech is a factor, but not the
only factor, cited in adverse action taken against a public employee (in
that case, a fired Ohio schoolteacher). 33 3 Under Mt. Healthy, the
employee/plaintiff carries the initial burden to come forward with
evidence of engaging in constitutionally protected expression that was a
334
The burden then
"substantial factor" motivating the adverse action.
evidence that
the
of
preponderance
a
by
show
to
shifts to the employer
absence of
the
in
even
the same decision would have been made anyway,
33 5
Mt. Healthy provides a safety valve to
the protected expression.
insulate agencies against unfounded claims, because truly unfounded
cases will stumble at the first step of the analysis and be subject to
expedited dismissal. 3 36
A Mt. Healthy-type analysis would not be especially burdensome on
33 7
As
government in the case of a purportedly retaliatory forum closure.
338 the government
forums,
public
traditional
with
even
is recognized
should always be able to close a limited or designated forum if the nature
of the property fundamentally changes, such as a college tearing down a
formerly accessible bulletin board to make way for constructing a new
parking garage. If the risk of constitutional scrutiny for censoring, or
excluding citizen speakers, is too great for government agencies to
undertake, there are technological workarounds; for instance, a Facebook
page can be designed from its inception to be a one-way bulletin board
for government announcements, not a comment board opened up for two39
way public interaction, without offending the First Amendment.

331.
332.
333.
334.

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 287.

335. Id. Although the Court's brief opinion in Mt. Healthy does not cite it, the test appears
to be a variation of the burden-shifting analysis recognized by the Court in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973), which applies in more traditional employment
discrimination cases where speech is not at issue.
336. LoMonte & Calvert, supra note 34, at 61.
337. See Elzinga, supra note 315, at 521 (advocating for application of a Mt. Healthyanalysis
to the full or partial closure of any forum, even a nonpublic one).

338. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy,
concurring) (observing that government "always retains authority to close a public forum, by
selling the property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal use").
339. Lidsky, supra note 61, at 2024.

J.,
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Applying the Mt. Healthy framework to a claim of retaliatory forum
closure, it would be the speaker's initial burden to identify
constitutionally protected speech that was a motivating factor in the
government agency's decision to revoke forum designation. That burden
would readily be satisfied by the weighty circumstantial evidence in the
Koala case, in which the UCSD Senate had not discussed rescinding
financial support for print publications until, days earlier, the magazine's
November 2015 edition provoked outcry on campus, including a
statement from university administrators read at the Senate meeting. 34 0
But the university could escape First Amendment liability by coming
forward with contrary evidence, if it exists, that the Media Policy was
already in the works before the November 2015 magazine and that the
Senate had non-retaliatory reasons for getting out of the business of
underwriting media publications. While Mt. Healthy would provide a
mechanism for a plaintiff like The Koala to get before a jury, where
substantial cause-and-effect evidence exists, the framework would also
weed out cases in which evidence of retaliation is thin or nonexistent (for
instance, a Facebook user who is disappointed that his local sheriff's
office has discontinued the agency's page, but did not post anything
provoking an adverse response from the agency). The O'Brien concernthat discerning the motive of a large legislative body is too difficult 34 1
can be fully accounted for as part of the plaintiff's initial burden. If the
plaintiff has nothing but stray comments from a few among multitudes of
legislators, that evidence will be insufficient to raise the causal inference,
and the case will be summarily dismissed.
Understandably, courts may hesitate to recognize a cause of action for
closure of even the smallest of forums, such as a state university taking
down a bulletin board, or a small-town police department deactivating its
Facebook page. But even a forum of minimal importance is already
susceptible to constitutional challenges-for instance, if a university
administrator rips a flyer off a bulletin board, or a police official deletes
a post from a Facebook page. 342 It seems improbable that a person who
genuinely suffered no retaliation would be so deeply invested in the
continued existence of a bulletin board as to undertake constitutional
litigation, and even in that unlikely event, the institution should readily
be able to demonstrate a content-neutral alternative motivation. 343
340. Koala v. Khosla, No. 16cv1296 JM(BLM), 2016 WL 6441470, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
1, 2016).
341. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
342. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hunt County, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that critic of
Texas sheriff's department stated an actionable First Amendment claim after employees of the
sheriff's office removed her critical posts and banned her from making future posts).
343. For instance, aesthetic considerations and concern for visual clutter have been deemed
to be reasonable, content-neutral reasons for making news publishers remove or modify their
newsracks on government property in such cases as Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill
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D. An Alternate Approach: FinancialSubsidies "De-forum-ized"
Courts have long struggled with the proper First Amendment analysis
when the "public property" that a speaker intends to use is government
financial support. The simple response may be: Stop struggling.
While in Rosenberger and Southworth the Supreme Court treated
public subsidies (in those cases, student activities fees allocated through
public universities) as designated public forums,344 other subsidy cases
have eschewed the forum construct. In National Endowmentfor Arts v.
Finley,34 5 the Supreme Court wriggled out of the constraints of forum
doctrine to uphold content-based legislation requiring the NEA to
346
consider "general standards of decency" in awarding grants to artists.
The Justices distinguished the student fee cases on the basis that the NEA,
unlike college fee boards, selectively awarded grants in a competitive
34 7
process based on evaluating the artistic merit of the applicant's work.
Because the NEA's award process was already inherently content-based,
the Court ruled, the NEA funding system could not be regarded as a
48
forum held open for speakers' indiscriminate use.3 This distinction is
somewhat contrived and unpersuasive. Nothing in the Southworth or
Rosenberger cases indicates that fees were awarded indiscriminately
without regard for the applicants' merits. Unlike student fees-which
34 9 -every one of
support a wide variety of activities, not at all expressive
the NEA's grantees was engaged in expression, and indeed, facilitating
35 0 Moreover, the
their expression was the purpose of the grant program.
Court's distinction perversely makes censorship self-validating: by
Finley's dubious logic, if the University of Virginia could have shown a
longstanding practice of selectively denying financial support to
publications based on their religious content, then the university could
have prevailed in Rosenberger.

Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 186 (1st Cir. 1996) and Gold Coast Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 1994). See also Elzinga, supra note 315, at 524-25
(enumerating non-content-based justifications that could furnish the basis for restricting or closing

a forum, including overcrowding, construction, safety).
344. See generally Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217
(2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
345. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
346. Id. at 576.
347. Id. at 586.
348. Id.
349. See Erica Goldberg, Must Universities 'Subsidize' Controversial Ideas?: Allocating
Security Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J.

349, 365 (2011) (pointing out that "[s]ome portion of a university's student activities fees usually
covers expenses unrelated to student organizations, like intramural sports, student health services,
and costs related to infrastructure.").

350. Finley, 524 U.S. at 573.
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Perhaps Justice David Souter, the lone dissenter in Finley, had the
better of the analysis when he rejected the majority's attempts to steer
around Rosenberger and instead recharacterized Rosenberger as a case
about viewpoint discrimination rather than a case about forum doctrine:

'

Leaving aside the proper application of forum analysis to
the NEA and its projects, I cannot agree that the holding of
Rosenberger turned on characterizing its metaphorical
forum as public in some degree. Like this case, Rosenberger
involved viewpoint discrimination, and we have made it
clear that such discrimination is impermissible in all forums,
even nonpublic ones, . .. where, by definition, the
government has not made public property generally
available to facilitate private speech[.] .. . Accordingly,
Rosenberger's brief allusion to forum analysis was in no
way determinative of the Court's holding.3 5
In dissent, Souter said aloud what the 8-1 majority only hinted at: That
long established First Amendment doctrine already accounts for cases in
which government funding is withheld on the basis of content or
viewpoint without the need to construct a mythical forum.
If Finley represents a "trial separation" of financial support from the
forum doctrine, the Court's subsequent 2013 decision in Agency for
InternationalDevelopment v. Alliance for Open Society International,
Inc. ,352 involving grants from the U.S. Agency for International
Development, represents the divorce. 35 3
In that case, the Justices eschewed forum analysis entirely, not even
mentioning the concept, as they struck down conditions imposed on
federal grantees that unduly constrained speech. 35 4 Specifically, the Court
found that AID, which administers federal foreign-aid programs,
overreached in requiring that grantees conducting AIDS awareness
outreach in Africa to promise to advocate against prostitution, even if (as
the plaintiff/applicant contended) that advocacy position might
compromise their effectiveness in working with people engaged in
prostitution.3 55
Rather than treat the AIDS grant program as any type of forum, the
Court applied an "unconstitutional conditions" analysis, under which
federal funding may not be withheld as a tool to compel an applicant to

351. Id. at 615 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).

352. 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
353. See id. at 210.
354. Id. at 221.
355. Id. at 208.
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6
espouse governmentally approved beliefs. 35 The Court distinguished
between grant programs by which the government contracts with private
individuals to carry out mutually shared objectives-for instance,
selectively funding only healthcare agencies that offer alternatives to
abortion, which is permissible 3 57-versus grant programs that coerce
recipients to change their positions, which is not permissible. Because
opposing prostitution was not operationally necessary to the purpose of
the grant program, the funding condition unconstitutionally compelled
grantees to parrot the government's speech.
With little effort, the USAID method of analysis can neatly fit with a
Koala-type scenario. While the refusal to offer financial support to
student publications could be viewed as the closure of a forum, it could
also be viewed as an unconstitutionally coercive condition-that is, had
the Koala written favorably about "safe spaces" on college campuses
rather than unfavorably, it would have remained eligible to compete for
grants. 35 8 The Supreme Court has already made just this observation,
finding no analytical distinction between a rule that conditions receipt of
a government benefit on speech versus a rule that punishes someone for
that same speech. 3 59
The First Circuit Court of Appeals decoupled public financial support
from forum analysis in considering a First Amendment case challenging
a state university's decision to discontinue financial support for a student
legal-aid clinic. 3 60 The plaintiffs alleged that the closure came in
retaliation for litigation against the university brought by students using
361 But the
the clinic's services, thus implicating the First Amendment.
court treated the decision as the withdrawal of a subsidy for speech, rather
than as the closure of a forum for speech, and found no constitutional
violation. 3 6 2 Although the First Circuit's application of the "subsidized
speech" principle was arguably overly deferential to the government, the
court recognized that, in different factual contexts, the retaliatory

356. Id. at 212. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1413, 1428 (1989) (explaining evolution of doctrine constraining Congress' ability to use
funding to coerce recipients to adopt federal priorities).
357. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991).
358. Outside the funding context, the Court has recognized that government may not use
coercive means to compel speakers to espouse the views favored by the government. See generally

West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that schools cannot
compel students to stand and recite Pledge of Allegiance when doing so contravenes their
religious beliefs).
359. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10, 592 (1998) (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
360. See Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F. 2d 473, 478 (1st Cir.
1989).
361. Id. at 475.
362. Id. at 482.
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withdrawal of government subsidies to punish speech can give rise to
First Amendment liability. 3 6 3
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's disposition of the motion to dismiss in
Koala v. Khosla already hints at abandoning the "forum closure"
construct in favor of a more practical approach. 364 Apart from forum
doctrine, the panel's opinion finds that the magazine's editors can
challenge the withdrawal of financial support as they could challenge the
viewpoint-discriminatory denial of any other government benefit. 3 65
Citing the Supreme Court's Finley decision, the court concluded that "the
government may not 'leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis
366
of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints[.]"'
To dispense with the forum analysis where the "forum" is a grant
program would simplify the analysis and, in all probability, lead to
outcomes equally or more speech-protective by way of a straighter path.
Rather than quibble over the imaginary boundaries of a forum that no one
can see, courts could simply proceed to the decisive First Amendment
question: Is this funding condition based on the content of speech, and if
so, can that content-based distinction be justified on the basis that the,
government has contracted with a willing speaker to carry out a shared
priority?
If we recognize that retaliation is just retaliation-and not "the
retaliatory closure of a forum"-then it is a small step to recognizing that
the denial of financial support is just the denial of financial support, and
not "the retaliatory closure of a metaphysical forum." Sometimes,
William of Ockham's admonition turns out to be right: The solution
requiring the fewest assumptions really does fit best. 3 67
CONCLUSION

If a designated public forum is to have any significance, it must have
durability. A "public forum" ceases to have meaning if governments can
flip the "off' switch at will whenever a disfavored speaker shows up
bearing an unpopular message. Judges may choose to apply the construct
of "forum closure"-o>r as this Article suggests, may simplify the analysis
by merely applying boilerplate First Amendment principles against
363. Id-at 481 (demonstrating how the court failed to explain why the line of cases expressly
prohibiting retaliation did not apply to the facts at hand.). But see Nat'l Endowment for Arts v.

Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (explaining how the Justices observed that a claim could still lie
if, in applying the grantmaking criteria, the NEA retaliated against speakers based on viewpoint.).

364. See generally Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019).
365. See id. at 898-99.
366. Id. at 898 (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587).
367. See Richard H. Helmholz, Ockham 's Razor in American Law, 21 TUL. EuR. & Civ. L.F.

109,

110-11 (2006) (explaining how judges have applied a philosophical principle coined by 14th

century philosopher, sometimes simplified as "complicated explanations of observed phenomena
should not ordinarily be accepted without proof of their necessity").
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retaliation and message-based funding conditions. But, in no event should
the judiciary abdicate oversight of government decisions intended to deny
unwanted speakers a platform. If we recognize-and we should-that it
is a wrongful act of discrimination to close the swimming pool when
people of color show up wanting to use it, then we should equally
recognize "draining the free-speech pool" as an actionable wrong.

